(Dis)engagement in the Russo-Ukraine war

Abstract

The policy commentary aims to determine how the engagement of Russia and Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict fluctuated from the beginning of the war to the annexation of part of Ukrainian lands. Drawing on Randall Collins’s analytical framework of conflict, the analysis uncovers the tendency to increase or stabilize a high level of engagement on the Ukrainian side and a decrease on the Russian side. In such a case, one might suppose that it is possible to end the war with Ukraine’s victory. Russia does not have adequate material and logistical resources. Its group solidarity, ideological polarization, emotional mobilization, and the allies’ support are insufficient to tip the tide of war in its favor. The partial mobilization of Russians and sending 300,000 soldiers to war will not change this situation because it is only one and not the essential feature of engagement.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine has no weapons of mass destruction. Simultaneously, Russia is treating nuclear weapons as a last resort. Ukraine will be significantly destroyed if Russia launches several dozen tactical nuclear missiles. It inevitably will be followed by NATO’s decision to use a parallel, though not necessarily nuclear, response, leading to the destruction of the Russian key military potential. In this case, the land forces and the Black Sea Fleet are usually mentioned as targets. The desire for retaliation and the inability to acknowledge defeat may be the main reasons for Putin’s next step and the mobilization of strategic nuclear forces. It will force the US to respond immediately with MAD doctrine, resulting in the complete annihilation of at least the Northern Hemisphere. This scenario is only possible if Putin’s decisions remain irrational and implemented.