Conceptualization and operationalization of institutional ambidextrousness in the political system

Abstract

The article provides a theoretical and methodological substantiation and operationalization of the concept of institutional ambidexterity as a strategic mechanism for adapting political systems to conditions of unprecedented uncertainty and existential challenges. Institutional ambidexterity is interpreted not merely as an organizational characteristic, but as a deliberately constructed “two-handed” governance architecture capable of combining processes of exploitation — the improvement of existing procedures to maintain stability — and exploration, which involves the generation of radical innovations and new opportunities for development. Particular attention is devoted to the regime dimension of the problem. Authoritarian systems, despite their capacity to ensure highly efficient exploitation of resources in the short term, tend to fall into a “success trap” and develop forms of imitative ambidexterity due to hierarchical fragmentation and the atrophy of horizontal linkages. Democratic systems, by contrast, owing to their polycentric structure, institutional competition, and developed feedback mechanisms, demonstrate a greater potential for adaptive resilience in the long-term perspective. The methodological novelty of the study lies in shifting the analytical focus from evaluating the content of public policies to examining the “architecture of flexibility” of the political system itself. A three-level framework for assessing institutional ambidexterity is proposed: the first level measures institutional stability and control; the second evaluates adaptive flexibility and innovativeness; and the third, synthetic level focuses on the analysis of ambidextrous balance and systemic resilience. The proposed model incorporates criteria and indicators related to iterative learning, inclusiveness of monitoring, and institutional emergence. The article also examines the phenomenon of “double institutionalization” in transitional democracies, where external influence functions as an exogenous driver of innovation while simultaneously creating the risk of a “failure trap” in cases where domestic institutions lack the internal capacity and preparedness for transformation.