Policing civil disorder in pandemic-driven Bulgaria
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31558/2519-2949.2022.3.7Keywords:
Bulgaria; police; pandemic; civil disorder; protestsAbstract
The coronavirus pandemic and numerous restrictions introduced have fostered numerous gatherings and protest actions. Citizens expressed dissatisfaction with the restriction of their rights and freedoms, while at the same time demanding a solution to the problems that took place before the pandemic occurred. In Bulgaria, the problems included corruption, dissatisfaction with the government, and the failure to respect the independence of the judiciary. For this reason, from July 9, 2020 to April 16, 2021 there were protests of citizens who demanded, among others, changes and resignation of the government. The analysis will provide answers to two research questions: what actions did the protesters take between July 2020 and April 2021? How did the security services deal with civil disorder during the protests? The main research problem relates to the impact of repression on mobilization or demobilization and the use of violent actions by protesters. By delving into actions, the study will differentiate between violent and peaceful actions. In turn, by evaluating the security services’ actions, the study will differentiate between repressive and non-repressive protest policing. The method used in this study is the qualitative source analysis. It draws on the technique of content analysis of specifically media coverage of the activities of the police and protest participants during the indicated period. The analysis rests on the reports that appeared on the most important websites and Internet portals reporting on the course of the protests. Based on the analysis, it was found that the main demands and goals remained unchanged, the actions taken by the protesters included many types of violent and peaceful activities. On the side of the security services, a division was also made into repressive and non-repressive activities. The protests ended naturally with the end of the government’s term. Repressions had no impact on mobilisation and fuelled violent protests.
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