Georgia’s foreign policy under the new balance of power in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh war
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31558/2519-2949.2022.1.18Keywords:
South Caucasus; foreign policy; Georgia; European and Euro-Atlantic integration; Second Karabakh war; 3 3 PlatformAbstract
The article examines the specific features of Georgia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus. The key interests that shape the foreign policy orientation of Tbilisi (European and Euro-Atlantic integration; liberation of the occupied territories; use of the state’s transit potential) are determined. The article analyzes the position of Georgia in relation to the current regional initiatives, which form the agenda of the South Caucasian politics after the events of the Second Karabakh War. The readiness of Georgia to play the role of a mediator in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is emphasized – however, at the same time, the limited potential of Tbilisi in this matter is pointed out. Concerns from some of the Georgian experts about the prospects of unblocking the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are describes, as such scenario may deprive Georgia of its exclusive role as a transit hub. The impossibility of Georgia’s participation in the work of multilateral regional formats, which include the Russian Federation, is explained. Also, the influence of the internal political factor on the foreign policy of Tbilisi is considered in the article. Aggravation of the confrontation between the authorities (“Georgian Dream”) and the opposition (“United National Movement”) exacerbates the situation, threatening the interests of the state. At the same time, the critical approach of certain Western experts to assessing the activities of the Georgian authorities is noted, as they see signs of a deliberate undermining of the pro-Western course from Tbilisi. These fears do not affect the immutability of European and EuroAtlantic integration, which is being implemented by Georgia. No alternative for such course is determined by public opinion, which demonstrates an extremely high level of support for the idea of membership in the EU and NATO. However, a clear pro-Western orientation at the same time limits Tbilisi’s regional potential. In fact, it is difficult for Georgia to find its place in the region in the context of an intensified competition for influence between the Russian Federation and Turkey, as well as under the conditions of decrease of Western influence in the South Caucasus
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