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ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2822-2268>

**Yagunov D., Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen (Germany), Vasyl Stus
Donetsk National University**

MOSCOVIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION: THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON CRIME IN UKRAINE IN THE LIGHT OF STATISTICS FOR 2013-2024

The paper focuses on the 2013-2024 crime trends in Ukraine subjected to changes and challenges due to the 2022 Moscovian military invasion of Ukraine. The article demonstrates that the number of crimes committed in Ukraine in 2022, 2023 and 2024 exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021. The author concludes that continuous attacks on Ukrainian cities by Russian drones and missiles and destruction of the infrastructure left many people without their homes, incomes, hopes and perspectives. Therefore, the number of crimes increased significantly in 2023-2024 considering the ruination of all aspects of economic and social life in Ukraine. All these factors, including further mass migration of people from the frontline areas, increased crimes rates significantly. In addition, the crime landscape took new forms and characteristics having received the injection of purely wartime crimes (crimes against military service, war crimes and crimes against national security). For example, in 2022, law enforcement agencies registered five times more crimes against national security as compared to the whole period of 2013-2021. The author found that the Moscovian military invasion had brought an increase in numbers of crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization. Additionally, crime rates resulting from illegal use of firearms rose after February 2022. The War also increased the number of crimes committed with the use of explosives. These crimes have indicated a dualistic trend: 1) the number of crimes increased; 2) the number of criminal proceedings with suspects decreased. The author argues that all material and human resources of Ukraine have been directed to the needs of the defence of the state from the Moscovian military aggression, including the police. Therefore, the quality of investigation of crimes and the preventive effect of criminal punishment decreased proportionally. The War made criminality more rural and 'cut' the numbers of detected crimes against human life and health. The author argues that police statistics on torture occupy a very controversial place in the analysis of the general structure of crime in Ukraine. The number of officially registered crimes of torture determines many questions concerning the latent nature of this type of crime as well as the effectiveness of investigation of torture by state agents which become known to the society. At the same time, sex crimes decreased significantly in 2022, as could be expected from the wartime society. The article is also focused on the trends of domestic violence which became an interesting phenomenon of the crime landscape in wartime Ukraine. In the light of the absence of both victims and perpetrators due to mass migration of potential victims and participation of many potential perpetrators in military actions, crime rates go up. No less interesting picture one can find in the case of drug-related crimes. Even in the light of further escalation of military actions, the state continues focusing even on minor drug crimes, what raises the question of the effectiveness and efficiency of crime prevention during the War. While considering property crimes in wartime Ukraine, the first hypothesis appears that the absence of properly organised policing would lead to a serious increase of the number of property crimes. However, the number of property crimes decreased significantly. In contrast, the crime of fraud demonstrates absolutely another trend. Additionally, economic offences and 'white-collar' crimes also demonstrate how crime has adapted to wartime conditions.

Keywords: *Ukraine, crime prevention, crime trends, police statistics, criminology, the 2022 Moscovian military aggression against Ukraine, full-scaled aggression of Russia against Ukraine, the police, policing, law enforcement agencies.*

Introduction. This paper aims at research of the crime trends in Ukraine in the period of 2013-2024 where the focus is made on the *impact* of the 2022 Moscovian military aggression (*the War*) on criminality

in Ukraine and the national crime prevention policy.

In addition to the previously developed and published author’s research and conclusions, this paper is focused on the issues of the characteristics of offenders where special attention is paid to trends in personal and social characteristics of offenders occurred during the War.

This paper is based on the previous author’s papers focused on crime trends in Ukraine in different periods of 2022 (Yagunov, D. (2022). *Crime prevention policy in Ukraine in the light of crime statistics for the period of eight months of 2022. Bulletin of the Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University. Series Political sciences. Volume 4. P.p. 28-45*; Yagunov, D. (2022). *Criminal justice system of Ukraine in the wartime: impacts and challenges. European Political and Law Discourse. Volume 9, Issue 4. P.p. 33-51*; Yagunov, D. (2022). *Impact of the 2022 Russian military aggression on crime trends in Ukraine (analysis of crime prevention policy in the light of crime statistics for ten months of 2022). European Political and Law Discourse. Volume 9, Issue 6. P.p. 35-80*).

Terminology. According to Article 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, notification of suspicion shall be necessarily issued in the following cases: 1) apprehension of an individual at the scene of a criminal offence or immediately after the commission of a criminal offence; 2) enforcement of a measure of restraint against an individual as prescribed by this Code; 3) availability of sufficient evidence to suspect a person of having committed a criminal offence.

Therefore, in this paper, we describe 2013-2024 crime trends in Ukraine based on two main indicators of the Ukrainian criminal justice system: 1) the general number of criminal proceedings opened and registered by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (the number of crimes); 2) the number of criminal proceedings where concrete suspects were given the notifications (notes) of suspicion.

In corresponding tables and diagrams, we use the term “*notifications*”, which reflects the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects (the number of notifications of suspicion).

Crime Rates. In 2022, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (*hereafter – LEA*) registered 362636 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where the above-mentioned numbers reflect both criminal proceedings with concrete suspects and so-called “*factual*” criminal proceedings (without concrete suspects).

It should be noted that the number of registered crimes even for the period of ten months of 2022 almost reached the level of 2021 (a whole year). Consequently, the number of crimes committed in Ukraine in 2022 exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021 (321443 crimes) and the number of crimes committed in 2020 (360622 crimes) (*Figure 1*). The above-mentioned facts seem to be of a great importance due to the general presumption that negative social and economic consequences of the War would lead to increasing crime trends in Ukraine.

At the same time, in 2023, the LEA registered 475595 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where notes of suspicion were given in 189292 proceedings

Correspondingly, in 2024, the LEA registered 492479 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where notes of suspicion were given in 194688 proceedings.




Figure 1. Total number of registered crimes (2013 - 2024)

At the same time, as police statistics demonstrate, the number of criminal proceedings *with suspects* in 2022-2024 dropped significantly as compared with the pre-War period, which serves as an indicator of the decreasing effectiveness of the national criminal justice system. It could also be noted that the ratio between the number of criminal proceedings and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects has had a stable trend towards decreasing until the 2022 Moscovian military invasion. As a result, the criminal justice system of Ukraine has demonstrated one of the highest ratios in the last ten years (*Figure 2*).




Figure 2. Ratio between registered crimes and notifications (2013 – 2024)

Geographical Distribution of Crime. One of the main conclusions from research into crime trends in 2022 is that the War made criminality in Ukraine *more rural*. In 2013, the ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas was 4,04. However, in 2022, the same ratio decreased to the point of 3,45 with further decrease to the point of 2,35 in 2024 (*Figure 3*).




Figure 3. Geographical distribution of crime (1)

In the period of 2013-2021, urban crimes occupied 77 – 78% in the general structure of criminality in Ukraine. The beginning of the War has brought the minimum level of urban crime (74,14 %) and maximum level of rural crime (22,97 %) for the last ten years of national history of crime prevention. Moreover, in 2024, police statistics demonstrate the lowest level of crimes in urban areas (67.6%) and the highest level of crimes in rural areas (28,7%). It appears that such changes have resulted from the 2022 Moscovian military aggression, where many crimes were committed by Russian soldiers and officers in *rural* areas (*Figure 4*).




Figure 4. Geographical distribution of crime (2)

Nationality. As previously, crimes committed by foreign nationals in Ukraine occupy an insignificant segment in the general structure of criminality (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Crimes committed by foreigners

At the same time, the War has led to a reduction in crimes committed by foreign nationals (Figure 6). Probably, police statistics do *not* cover crimes committed by Moscovian military agents during the 2022 War. Nevertheless, there is no reference in the police statistics that the mentioned indicator does not cover crimes committed by Moscovian occupiers.




Figure 6. Percentage of crimes committed by foreigners

Age. One of the surprising conclusions drawn from police statistics is that the percentage of crimes committed by persons at the age of 18 – 59 years has changed since 2021. In other words, the War has led to changes in the percentage of crimes committed by adults under 60 years (*Figure 7*).




Figure 7. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 60

During the War, crime has become ‘older’ in Ukraine. The percentage of crimes committed by offenders over 60 has *increased*, which can be partly explained by involvement of such persons in collaboration with Moscovian occupiers before and during the War. However, the main number of passionaries who could commit crimes were recruited into the Army or join the Army voluntary (*Figure 8*).




Figure 8. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 18 and over 60

Police statistics demonstrate a *decrease* in involvement of persons over 60 in crimes against property, against public order (including illegal keeping of firearms) or drug-related crimes. In contrast, police statistics demonstrate an *increase* in involvement of persons over 60 in crimes against human life and health (1083 crimes in 2022, 145 crimes in 2023, and 1590 crimes in 2024) (*Table 1*).

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


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


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Tab. 1.

Offenders at the age over 60 (2016 – 2024)

Persons over 60 committed crimes	Against national security	Against life and health	Property crimes	Against public order	Drug-related crimes	Against justice	War crimes
2016	8	846	723	173	535	22	0
2017	13	858	924	338	610	17	1
2018	7	935	1120	313	380	14	0
2019	16	997	1129	295	409	25	0
2020	8	1098	1124	271	487	32	5
2021	13	1125	1160	239	388	33	3
2022	188	1083	753	197	353	24	201
2023	214	1453	1170	219	308	52	220
2024	130	1590	974	214	259	103	91

At the same time, in 2022, offenders over 60 committed many more *crimes against national security* as compared with the whole period of 2016-2021 (the ratio is 2,89) (Table 2, Figure 9).

Tab. 2.

Offenders over 60: general numbers

	Against national security (all offenders)	Against national security (over 60)	%	War crimes (all offenders)	War crimes (over 60)	%
2016	95	8	8,4%	2	0	0%
2017	107	13	12,1%	20	1	5%
2018	113	7	6,2%	4	0	0%
2019	117	16	13,7%	6	0	0%
2020	101	8	7,9%	21	5	24%
2021	111	13	11,7%	35	3	8,6%
2022	1455	188	12,9%	679	201	30%
2023	2373	214	9%	626	220	35,1%
2024	2303	130	5,6%	430	91	21,2%




Figure 9. Offenders over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security

Figure 10 demonstrates statistical data concerning the percentage of persons over 60 who committed crimes against national security and war crimes.




Figure 10. Percentage of offenders over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security

Police statistics demonstrate that in relative numbers, persons under 60 committed many more crimes against national security and war crimes as compared with other types of crimes (Table 3, Figure 11).

Tab. 3.

Percentage of offenders over 60

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Crimes against human life and health	5,39	7,13	6,59	7,17
Crimes against property	2,38	3,01	3,46	3,81
Crimes against public order	2,44	6,17	4,97	4,76
Drug-related crimes	3,35	2,79	1,65	1,34
Crimes against public services	8,40	8,96	7,33	6,68
Crimes against justice	1,59	2,16	2,91	3,48
Crimes against national security	11,71	12,92	9,01	5,64
War crimes	8,57	29,60	35,14	21,16




Figure 11. Percentage of offenders over 60

Offenders under 18. Police statistics show that the number of offenders under 18 having committed property crimes had reduced until 2022. Moreover, the number of such crimes dropped significantly in 2022-2024 as compared to 2021. In contrast, the number of offenders under 18 who committed crimes against human life and human health has reduced insignificantly (Figure 12).




Figure 12. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

In contrast, the number of offenders having committed drug-related crimes does not show such rapid trends to the decrease, which can prove a hypothesis that the War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market, which is informally controlled by the police (*Figure 13*).




Figure 13. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice

Offenders at the age 18 – 28. Police statistics show that the number of offenders at the age of 18 – 28 years having committed property crimes has also had a trend to reduce until 2022. The number of offenders having committed crimes against human life and human health has increased (*Figure 14*).




Figure 14. Number of offenders at the age 18 – 28 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

As in previous example with drug-related crimes committed by persons under 18, the number of offenders at the age of 18 – 28 who committed drug-related crimes does *not* demonstrate such rapid trends towards the decrease, which can also prove the hypothesis that the War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market, which is informally controlled by the police.

Offenders at the age 29 – 39. As far as offenders at the age of 29 – 39 are concerned, the corresponding crime rates reflect the general crime trends typical for Ukraine.

We can also point to reduction in persons at the age of 29 – 39 who committed crimes against human life and human health in 2022 with further increase. At the same time, numbers of drug offenders seem to be *not* influenced by the War, which gives us additional grounds to argue about the illegal control of the police over the illegal drug market and its ‘customers’ (*Figure 16*).




Figure 15. Number of offenders at the age 18 – 28 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice




Figure 16. Number of offenders at the age 29 – 39 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

As far as crimes against public service and against justice are concerned, the number of offenders at the age of 29 – 39 having committed the above-mentioned crimes dropped significantly in 2022, which can also be explained with the impact of the War on normal life of Ukrainian society (*Figure 17*). However, in 2023 and 2024, the number of crimes against public service and against justice increased, mainly due to crimes of not-execution of judicial decisions.




Figure 17. Number of offenders at the age 29 – 39 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice

Offenders at the age 40 – 54. The conclusions presented above could also be used in relation to offenders at the age of 40 – 54: reduction in crimes against human life and human health, as well as serious reduction in property crimes in 2022 (*Figure 18*).




Figure 18. Number of offenders at the age 40 – 54 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

In line with previous conclusions, it is not surprising that the number of persons at the age of 40 – 54 committed drug-related crimes had *increased*.

In contrast, the number of persons committed crimes against public security, public service and justice had decreased in 2022 with further increase in 2023-2024 (*Figure 19*).




Figure 19. Number of offenders at the age 40 – 54 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice

Offenders at the age 55 – 59. The same conclusions could be drawn from the police statistics in relation to offenders at the age of 55 – 59 (*Figure 20*).

As it was argued before, the crime trends of drug offences seem to be *not* influenced by the War, which gives us additional grounds to argue about the control of the police over the illegal drug market (*Figure 20*).




Figure 20. Number of persons at the age 55 – 59 committed crimes against life and health, property crimes and drug-related crimes

In contrast, the number of persons having committed crimes against public order, public service and justice has decreased in 2022 with further increase in 2023 and 2024 (Figure 21).




Figure 22. Number of offenders at the age 55 – 59 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice

Offenders over 60. Finally, the number of offenders over 60 years who committed crimes against property decreased significantly after the War started, with further increase in 2023. At the same time, the number of offenders over 60 years who committed crimes against human life and human health increased significantly in 2023 and 2024.

The number of persons who committed drug-related crimes, as could be predicted in the light of previously drawn conclusions, has decreased insignificantly (Figure 23).




Figure 23. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes




Figure 24. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against public order, public service and justice

As far as we have paid special attention to offenders having committed drug-related crimes, we have decided to present the numbers of the above-mentioned offenders graphically in a separate Figure (Figure 25).

Here, we can observe the numbers of offenders of the mentioned category for the period of 2016 – 2024.

If we exclude the pick of such persons at the age of 29 – 39 registered in 2017, we can conclude that there had been no rapid changes in this number until the War started. In other words, the War has *significantly* impacted the number of such persons after the War started.




Figure 25. Persons committed drug-related crimes (1)

The same generally could be said in relation to drug offenders under 18 years and drug offenders over 55 years. It is obvious that the War has impacted the numbers of such drug offenders: people in the age of 55 – 59 became involved more in drug crimes, people over 60 became involved less in drug crimes (Figure 26, Table 4).




Figure 26. Persons committed drug-related crimes (2)

With an aim to compare trends in numbers of offenders having committed *drug-related crimes* (Figure 25, Figure 26), we can demonstrate the same figures but with offenders having committed *property crimes* (Figure 27, Figure 28).

Here, we can note how the War significantly impacted the numbers of *property offenders* where the average numbers of such persons remain unchanged in 2024 as compared with 2022 (Figure 27, Figure 28, Table 5).




Figure 27. Number of offenders committed property crimes (1)

Tab. 4.

Age of persons committed drug crimes

Age of persons committed drug crimes	Over 60	55 – 59	40 – 54	29 – 39	18 – 28	Under 18
2016	535	364	2638	4715	2814	118
2017	610	455	3767	6970	3722	147
2018	380	365	3290	6016	3140	104
2019	409	352	3437	5777	3145	111
2020	487	354	3019	5018	3193	100
2021	388	270	2886	4935	2993	107
2022	353	268	3074	5434	3422	82
2023	308	304	4414	7547	4598	111
2024	259	347	5068	7604	4698	97




Figure 28. Number of offenders committed property crimes (2)

Tab. 5.

Offenders in different age groups

Offenders committed property crimes	Under 18	18 – 28	29 – 39	40 – 54	55 – 59	Over 60
2016	3224	18858	18623	9409	1194	723
2017	3400	20098	23358	11447	1398	924
2018	3050	19035	24576	12687	1657	1120
2019	2570	15861	22703	12063	1437	1129
2020	2080	13209	19329	10963	1363	1124
2021	1793	11808	17994	10524	1273	1060
2022	820	6037	10130	6424	807	753
2023	1013	6856	11726	8314	1086	1170
2024	713	5350	8687	6752	841	974

Educational Background. The wartime period has put on the agenda an interesting aspect concerned with *educational background* of offenders (Figure 29, Table 6).

The percentage of offenders with *professional (technical) education* for the period of twelve months of 2022 was the same as compared with 2021, while the percentage of offenders with a *university degree* increased to the level of 13,73 % (Figure 29, Figure 30, Table 6).

Moreover, for the period of 2016-2022 there was a trend of increase in the proportion of offenders with a *university degree*. After the 2022 invasion, the number of offenders with a *university degree* remains mostly unchanged. In contrast, for the period of 2016-2024 there was a trend of decrease in the proportion of offenders with *no education*.




Figure 29. Percentage of offenders with university degrees and with no education

Tab. 6.

	University degree	Technical education	Secondary school	No education
2016	9,21	24,39	63,33	3,06
2017	9,74	24,09	63,18	2,98
2018	9,33	24,32	63,72	2,63
2019	9,71	24,45	63,39	2,45
2020	9,99	22,45	65,24	2,32
2021	10,67	18,71	68,63	1,98
2022	13,78	18,05	66,69	1,48
2023	13,34	17,86	67,47	1,33
2024	13,39	17,92	67,57	1,19

As far as offenders with technical education are concerned, the War has not impacted significantly on their percentage in the general number of offenders (18,71 % in 2021, 18,05 % in 2022, 17,86 % in 2023, 17,92% in 2024) (Figure 30).




Figure 30. Percentage of offenders with technical education

As far as offenders with secondary school education are concerned, the War has decreased their percentage in the general number of offenders (68,63 % in 2021, 66,69 % in 2022, 67,47 % in 2023, 67,57 % in 2024) (Figure 31).




Figure 31. Percentage of offenders with secondary school education

Crimes against Human Life and Health. We can observe how the War “cut” the number of *detected* crimes against human life and health in March 2022 because of the reasons mentioned above. As a result, in July 2022, the number of crimes against human life and health, previously dropped seriously in March 2022, has reached the level of January 2022 in July 2022.

In 2021, 33657 crimes against human life and public health were committed. At the same time, notes of suspicion were given only 22524 criminal proceedings.

In 2022, 43199 against human life and public health were committed. At the same time, notes of suspicion were given only 16559 criminal proceedings.

In 2023, 63766 crimes against human life and public health were committed. At the same time, notes of suspicion were 22920 criminal proceedings.

In 2024, 80054 crimes against human life and public health were committed. At the same time, notes of suspicion were given only 23365 criminal proceedings (*Figure 32*).




Figure 32. Crimes against life and health (1)




Figure 33. Crimes against life and health (2)




Figure 34. Intentional homicide: crimes and notifications (2021 – 2024)

In contrast, only 5% of perpetrators were identified in 2022, only 2,8 % of perpetrators in 2023, and only 1,9 % of perpetrators in 2024 that indicates an obvious operational weakness of the national criminal justice system in the wartime (*Figure 35*).




Figure 35. Intentional homicide: ratio of crimes and notifications (2021 - 2024)

One most important conclusion from the above-mentioned comparative analysis is a big difference in numbers of intentional homicides, which is obviously concerned with the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, it is difficult to separate the number of murders committed by Moscovian *military* agents from those which were committed by Ukrainian ‘*civilian*’ criminals.

Minor Crimes against Human Health. As far as interaction between victims and the LEA is concerned, after the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, Ukrainians applied much less to the LEA with claims of minor injuries (*Figure 36*).

These trends can also be explained by that people generally understood the priorities of the law-enforcement system in the wartime period, where the police officers would probably be expected to *sabotage* registering minor crimes and minor offences.

Here, we present police statistics of all minor crimes against human health committed in 2013-2024 (statistics of 2020 – 2022 include data on minor crimes and minor offences against health, according to Article 12 of the Criminal Code (“*Classification of criminal offences*”)).

Another important conclusion from the above police statistics is that the Ukrainian criminal justice system has adapted to the wartime conditions and challenges and “*swum out*” from the deep crisis. At least, the fact that the police have turned back again to registering minor crimes and minor offences against human health can be considered as a normalization of the police routine (*Figure 36*).




Figure 36. Minor crimes and minor offences against health

Torture. Police statistics on torture (Article 127 of the Criminal Code) occupy a controversial place in the analysis of the general structure of crime in Ukraine. On one hand, systematic torture by the police and prison officers has shaped corresponding views on torture practices in the Ukrainian society and media. The Ukrainian society has a strong view that ill-treatment by the police and prison officers is a *wide-spread phenomenon*. On the other one, the number of officially registered crimes of torture determines many questions concerning the *latent nature* of this type of crime as well as the *effectiveness of investigation* of torture by state agents in Ukraine which become known to the society (Table 7).

Tab. 7.

Torture: general numbers of criminal proceedings

Torture	Crimes	Proceedings with suspects	Indictments sent to courts	Dropped proceedings
2016	62	20	13	26
2017	82	37	26	26
2018	163	59	51	43
2019	140	34	22	25
2020	129	59	32	52
2021	79	33	25	33
2022	68	20	16	21
2023	94	53	37	24
2024	124	78	58	24

The police statistics indicate the next trends of crime of torture in Ukraine: 1) before the 2022 War, there was a decline in number of crimes of torture registered by the LEA; 2) after the War started, the number of crimes of torture increased rapidly and reached the level of the 2020 indicators.

At the same time, both the pre-War and the War periods demonstrate a strong trend that only 40% of criminal proceedings had a clear judicial perspective (28 % before the War (2016 - 2021) and 50% in the period of 2022–2024).

Additionally, the percentage of *dropped* criminal proceedings stimulates additional questions about the *effectiveness* of pre-trial investigation of tortures. The specific feature of crimes of torture is that the victim can identify a perpetrator or at least to provide the information that he or she was subjected to torture in a concrete police department or in a concrete prison (Table 8).




Figure 37. Torture

Tab. 8.

Torture: indictments sent to courts and dropped criminal proceedings

Torture	Torture: Percentage of criminal proceedings with suspects	Torture: Indictments sent to courts	Torture: Percentage of dropped criminal proceedings
2016	32,3	20,9	41,9
2017	45,1	31,7	31,7
2018	36,2	31,3	26,4
2019	24,3	15,7	17,8
2020	45,7	24,8	40,3
2021	41,8	31,6	41,8
2022	29,4	23,5	30,9
2023	56,4	39,4	25,5
2024	62,9	46,8	19,3

In general, after 2022, a positive trend can be detected when notes of suspicion were given in more criminal proceedings and less criminal proceedings were dropped. However, such even positive trends are far from the appropriate state of things: too many criminal proceedings are ‘factual’ (without suspects), too many criminal proceedings in torture cases are dropped (Figure 38).




Figure 38. Torture

Domestic Violence. In recent years, *domestic violence* has become an object of special attention by the Parliament, the Government and the society in general. Therefore, domestic violence could be an attractive object for a criminological research in the context of the impact of the War on the society.

In 2017, the Criminal Code was supplemented by Article 126-1 according to the Law № 2227-VIII of 06.12.2017 and amended by the Law № 3342-IX of 23.08.2023, where the domestic violence was defined as a crime.

According to the Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code, domestic violence is defined as intentional systematic commission of physical, psychological or economic violence against a spouse or former spouse or another person with whom the perpetrator is (was) in a family or close relationship, which results in physical or psychological suffering, health disorders, disability, emotional dependence or deterioration of the quality of life of the victim.

As the police statistics show, 4800 crimes resulted from domestic violence were registered in Ukraine in 2021. The next year, after the War started, 3360 crimes resulted from domestic violence were registered. Such a reduction could be explained by different factors like the mass migration of *potential* victims to other European countries and the participation of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions. In any case, the *traditional social basis* for domestic violence was minimised largely with the War (*Figure 39*).

However, in 2023, 6805 crimes resulted from domestic violence were registered in Ukraine. Moreover, in 2024, 8900 crimes resulted from domestic violence were registered in Ukraine.




Figure 39. Crimes resulted from domestic violence (2013 – 2024)

Two interesting facts are drawn from the analysis of official police statistics: 1) an *average* number of crimes resulted from domestic violence in 2022 decreased 1,42 times as compared with 2021; 2) an *average* number of crimes resulted from domestic violence in 2022-2024 is 2,9 times higher as compared with an *average* number of the same crimes in the period of 2012–2021 (2189 and 6355 correspondingly) (*Figure 40*).

It should be noted that police statistics distinguishes two indicators: 1) crimes *resulted* from domestic violence; 2) domestic violence as *a separate crime*.

Here, we can see the statistical data for both indicators:

- 2019: 2554 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 1068 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code);

- 2020: 3972 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 2213 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code);

- 2021: 4800 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 2432 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code);

- 2022: 3360 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 1498 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code);

- 2023: 6805 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 1824 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code);

- 2024: 8900 crimes resulted from domestic violence (total), 2810 crimes of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code).

Several conclusions could be drawn from police statistics.

Before the War started, there was a permanent trend that crimes of domestic violence constituted a half of all crimes resulted from domestic violence (42% in 2019, 55% in 2020, 51% in 2021). However, after the War started, the percentage of crime of domestic violence (Article 126-1 of the Criminal Code) reduced to the level of 35% (45% in 2022, 27% in 2023, 32% in 2024) in favour of *other crimes* resulted from domestic violence. We can presume that *other crimes* resulted from domestic violence could hide different forms of ill-treatment by private individuals, which is hidden from real statistical representation. At the same time, it is obviously problematic to separate domestic violence from other crimes resulted from domestic violence.




Figure 40. Domestic violence (2022 – 2024)

Crimes against Will, Honour and Dignity of a Person. At the same time, the number of *crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person* has increased significantly – from 782 crimes in 2021 to 1535 crimes in 2022.

At the same time, the number of criminal proceedings where offenders were informed on suspicion dropped significantly – from 412 criminal proceedings (2021) to 207 criminal proceedings (2022) (Figure 41).




Figure 41. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (2021 – 2024)

The highest indicator of crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person was registered in 2014 which could be explained with the political and social consequences of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity when people were regularly arbitrary deprived of their freedom (*Figure 37*).

What is more important is the fact that after the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, the average level of such crimes has doubled as compared with any year for the period of 2016-2021 (1535 crimes in 2022, 782 crimes in 2021, 712 crimes in 2020, 981 crimes in 2019, 939 crimes in 2018, 918 crimes in 2017, 734 crimes in 2016) (*Figure 42*).




Figure 42. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (2013 – 2024)

Drug-Related Crimes. The situation with *drug-related crimes* partly refutes the thesis that the War ‘cut’ all indicators of the police statistics. The number of many crimes stated in numerous Chapters of the Criminal Code, which was registered in March 2022, decreased sharply for completely understandable reasons. Many types of crimes that *might have been* expected to increase after the start of the 2022 Moscovian military invasion saw a sharp drop.

Nevertheless, it appeared that drugs, drug offenders (especially petty offenders) and drug-related crimes (especially minor crimes) were *absolutely another matter*.

In 2022, more than 34 thousand drug-related crimes were registered in wartime Ukraine (34398 criminal proceedings in general, 22678 criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion) (*Figure 43*).




Figure 43. Drug-related crimes

No less interesting is the fact that the ratio between the general number of registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion in 2022 appeared one of the highest for the last ten years (the exclusion is 2016 with ratio 1,66) (*Figure 44*).




Figure 44. Ratio between drug-related crimes and notifications

It could also be noted that in 2022, the general number of criminal proceedings in minor drug-related offences and minor drug-related crimes increased. At the same time, the general number of criminal proceedings in grave and special grave drug-related offences decreased, but not significantly.

In contrast, in 2024, the number of criminal proceedings in minor drug-related offences, minor drug-related crimes and special grave drug-related offences increased insignificantly. At the same time, the general number of criminal proceedings in grave drug-related offences increased drastically (14806 crimes in 2023, 21713 in 2024) (Figure 45).




Figure 45. Drug-related crimes: distribution (2013 –2024)

Accordingly, the general number of criminal proceedings with suspects in drug-related offences and minor drug-related crimes increased (Figure 46).




Figure 46. Notifications in drug-related crimes: distribution

It can be concluded from observing *Figure 47* that the biggest number of minor drug-related offences and drug-related crimes was registered in 2024 (for the period of 2014 – 2024).




Figure 47. Minor drug-related crimes and offences and notifications




Figure 48. Ratio between the number of criminal proceedings in minor drug-related crimes and offences and notifications

Here, we would like to draw some conclusions. The 2022 police statistics demonstrate that 34398 drug-related crimes have already been committed in 2022. In 2023, the police registered 39124 drug-related crimes. In 2024, the police registered 48233 drug-related crimes.

The importance of the fight against drug crime *cannot* be underestimated. However, the main question here is: *does the National Police of Ukraine effectively manage its personnel's potential under wartime conditions?*

The question is on the surface: drug-related crimes are mostly the crimes of *peacetime*. Considering closed borders, border checks, curfews and roadblocks, the number of *registered* drug-related crimes should theoretically have decreased, not the other way around.

It seems that the mechanism of an artificial '*market*' for drug-related crimes, where criminals are very often victims at the same time, and where police officers know *who*, *where* and *under what conditions* will commit the *next* 'crime', '*should not stand idle*' even during the War.

Offences against of Military Service (Military Crimes)

Expectedly, the number of offenses against military service (*military crimes*) has also increased significantly in 2022-2024. The increase took place due to purely 'wartime' Articles of the Criminal Code such as Article 407 ("*Abandoning a military unit or place of service*"), Article 408 ("*Desertion*") and Article 402 ("*Disobedience*").

Figure 49 demonstrates that increasing the personnel of the Military Forces of Ukraine expectedly led to an increase of crimes committed by Ukrainian military officials. In 2023, military staff committed 28666

military crimes. The next year, they committed 93900 military crimes what is 3,3 times bigger as compared to 2023 (Figure 49).




Figure 49. Crimes against military service

A special attention is paid here to the number of crimes of *absence without leave from a military unit or place of service* (Article 407 of the Criminal Code).

The police registered 16515 crimes in 2023 and 66240 crimes in 2024. At the same time the number of criminal proceedings with suspects were very low (2239 and 7398 correspondingly). The main conclusion here is that the number of registered crimes has in parallel to the decrease of identified suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (Figure 50).




Figure 50. Absence without leave from a military unit

Partly the same could be said about a more serious crime – *desertion* (Article 408 of the Criminal Code). If, in 2021, 117 crimes of desertion were registered, the number of crimes in 2022 increased up to the level of 3214. Moreover, 7771 crimes were registered in 2023 and 23209 crimes in 2024 (Table 51).

Here, we should mention that in 2014, the ratio between the number of registered crimes (*total number of criminal proceedings*) and the number of suspects (*criminal proceedings with notifications of suspicion*) was 1,4.

The same ratio was 1,1 in 2015, 11,4 in 2022, 45 in 2023, and 36 in 2024.

So, the main conclusion here is that the criminal justice system of Ukraine is mostly oriented now on the *quantitative* indicators rather than on the qualitative ones.




Figure 51. Desertion: registered crimes and suspicions

No fewer interesting criminological conclusions could be drawn from the analysis of crime foreseen by Article 426-1 of the Criminal Code (*Excess of power or official authority by a military official*). While in 2016, 65 crimes were registered with 17 suspects, in 2022, we can observe the increase in the distance between the number of crimes and number of suspects (*Figure 52*).




Figure 52. Excess of power by a military official

Police statistics indicate the following numbers: 426 crimes in 2022, 487 crimes in 2023, and 599 crimes in 2024.

As in the previous example with a crime of desertion, the ratio between the number of registered crimes (*total number of criminal proceedings*) and the number of suspects (*criminal proceedings with notifications of suspicion*) was 9,3 in 2021. In 2022, the same indicator increased to the level of 21, which also raises an issue of effectiveness of the military justice system (*Table 53*).




Figure 53. Excess of power by a military official: ratio between crimes and notifications

The 2022 Moscovian military invasion brought serious changes to practices of bringing military men to criminal liability for the offence of *unauthorised leaving of a battlefield or refusal to use weapons*. For the whole period of 2013-2024, only 2 criminal proceedings were registered (including 1 criminal proceeding with a given notification of suspicion). In 2022, the LEA registered 150 criminal proceedings (6 criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion) (*Table 54*).




Figure 54. Unauthorised leaving of a battlefield or refusal to use weapons (Art. 429)

The 2022 Moscovian military invasion brought serious changes to practices of bringing military men to criminal liability for the offence of *voluntary rendering oneself prisoner of war*.

For the whole period of 2013 – 2024, zero criminal proceedings were registered. In other words, this Article of the Criminal Code was ‘dead’ from the practical point of view. In 2022, the LEA registered 16 criminal proceedings (with no concrete suspects). In 2023-2024, there were only 18 criminal proceeding registered (*Table 55*).




Figure 55. Voluntary rendering oneself prisoner of war

No less ‘dead’ was Article 432 of the Criminal Code (*Marauding*). For the whole period of 2013-2024, only 2 criminal proceedings were registered with zero suspects (one criminal proceeding in 2014 and one criminal proceeding in 2022).

Property Crimes. While considering *property crimes* in wartime Ukraine, the first hypothesis appears that the absence of well and properly organized policing *would* lead to a serious increase of the number of property crimes.

Nevertheless, the number of recorded property crimes has in fact significantly *decreased* (*Figure 55*, *Figure 56*). The impact of the War on property crimes is more than obvious: 158729 property crimes in 2021, 113137 property crimes in 2022, 178902 property crimes sin 2023, and 132910 property crimes in 2024.




Figure 55. Property crimes

The same way the War impacted the practices of crimes of *theft*: 113517 thefts in 2021, 69496 thefts in 2022, 82123 thefts in 2023, and 55576 thefts in 2024 (Figure 56).




Figure 56. Theft

The same way the War impacted the practices of *car thefts*: 5571 car thefts in 2021, 2001 car thefts in 2022, 2266 car thefts in 2023, 1138 car thefts in 2024.

The same way the War impacted the practices of *robberies*: 4846 robberies in 2021, 2205 robberies in 2022, 1732 robberies in 2023, 1453 robberies in 2024 (Figure 57).




Figure 57. Robbery

The same way the War impacted the practices of *aggravated robberies*: 952 aggravated robberies in 2021, 492 aggravated robberies in 2022, 386 aggravated robberies in 2023 and 313 aggravated robberies in 2024 (Figure 58).




Figure 58. Aggravated robbery

The same way the War impacted the criminal practices of *racketeering*: 606 crimes of racketeering in 2021, 366 crimes of racketeering in 2022, 499 crimes of racketeering in 2023, and 279 crimes of racketeering in 2024 (Figure 59).




Figure 59. Racketeering

Surprisingly, crimes of *fraud* in 2022 demonstrated absolutely another trend: the number of crimes of fraud in 2022 (32086) appeared much bigger than in 2021 (23847). The police registered 82609 crimes of fraud in 2022 and 64978 crimes of fraud in 2024 (Figure 60).




Figure 60. Fraud

Here we can mention that in February 2022, many Ukrainians tried to restore order by themselves in conditions of the War chaos through demonstrative corporal punishment of marauders. Namely, “*there is a War here, and they are making money here*”. Many Ukrainians supported such inhumane methods, and what is important, among these “*many*” there were lawyers.

Almost one year has passed, and the police statistics have proven that, it turns out, the problem of Ukrainian society during the War was completely *different*, and official statistics convincingly proved the existence of the problem of *moral and ethical foundations of Ukrainian society* during the War: 1) during the 2022 War, criminal behaviour was considered as *less permissible* by individuals who belonged to the “*criminally addicted*” strata of the society; 2) criminal behaviour was considered as *more permissible* by individuals who were considered less inclined to commit crimes due to the presence of higher education, higher ‘social status’ and greater social adaptability (*Figure 61*).




Figure 61. Theft and fraud: criminal proceedings

Moreover, this trend is partially confirmed by the latest corruption scandals at the highest levels of government, which proves that the War is by *no means* a guarantee of the quasi-elites' understanding of the society's problems, where the *moral demand* of “*the water law of the jungle during a drought*” comes first (*Figure 62*).




Figure 62. Fraud: offences and minor crimes

Yes, be that as it may, the statistics of 2022 demonstrate the violation of, using Rudyard Kipling’s expression, the “*water truce in our jungle*”, namely: 1) a significant decrease in thefts (although, on the other hand, the tendency to decrease thefts existed even before the beginning of the war); 2) an explosive increase in cases of frauds; 3) a sharp decline in real estate fraud, which can be attributed to the war's impact on the real estate market.




Figure 63. Notifications in fraud: offences and minor crimes

Since the real estate market during the War stopped in fact, it is not surprising that the number of crimes of *real estate fraud* decreased rapidly (1312 crimes in 2020, 1356 crimes in 2021, 798 crimes in 2022, 1176 crimes in 2023, 1091 crimes in 2024) (Figure 64).




Figure 64. Real estate fraud

Economic Criminal Offences. It was predictable that the number of economic criminal offences would be also decreased: 5469 crimes in 2021, 3414 crimes in 2022, 4840 crimes in 2023, and 5139 crimes in 2024 (Figure 65).




Figure 65. Economic criminal offences

A much more interesting conclusion concerning economic criminal offences is that the ratio between the general number of criminal proceedings in economic crimes and criminal proceedings in economic crimes with notifications of suspicion remained mostly the same as in previous years. In 2022, this ratio increased insignificantly to the point of 2,4 from the level of 2 in 2021 (the same ratio of 2,4 can be found in 2018) (Figure 66).




Figure 66. Economic criminal offences: ratio between crimes and notifications

Criminal activities concerned with *the use of counterfeit money, government securities, state lottery tickets, excise tax stamps or holographic security features* (Article 199 of the Criminal Code) were also impacted with the War and reduced (859 crimes in 2019, 686 crimes in 2020, 494 crimes in 2021, 215 crimes in 2022, 328 crimes in 2023, and 288 crimes in 2024) (Figure 67).




Figure 67. Manufacture, storage, purchase, transportation, shipment, import to Ukraine for use in the sale of goods, sale of counterfeit money, government securities, state lottery tickets, excise tax stamps or holographic security features

The same could be said about *illegal actions in respect of remittance documents, payment cards and other means providing access to bank accounts, electronic money and equipment for their production* (Article 200 of the Criminal Code): 1577 crimes in 2021, 933 crimes in 2022, 468 crimes in 2023, and 745 crimes in 2024.

On the other hand, it is surprising that the number of registered crimes of such a category did not decrease more, as could be expected.

There were 724 crimes in 2022, 711 crimes in 2019, and 609 crimes in 2018.

If we exclude the 2021 indicator, the number of crimes committed in 2022 was the biggest one for the period of 2013-2024 (Figure 68).




Figure 68. Illegal actions in respect of remittance documents, payment cards and other means providing access to bank accounts, electronic money and equipment for their production

In 2022, in contrast, the number of crimes of *legalisation (laundering) of property proceeding from crime* (Article 209 of the Criminal Code) increased: 348 crimes in 2020, 395 crimes in 2021, 437 crimes in 2022, 969 crimes in 2023, and 1132 crimes in 2024 (Figure 69).

It could also be said that the number of these crimes has been stable in its increase since 2018. The 2022 Moscovian military invasion, as it could be found, did not impact such a trend (Figure 69).




Figure 69. Legalisation of property proceeding from crime

In 2022, crime of *financial fraud* (Article 222 of the Criminal Code) demonstrated a rapid reduction. In fact, the War led to zero indicators of such crimes in Ukraine. However, in 2023-2024, the police registered 107 such crimes (Figure 70).

Crimes Committed with Firearms. While analysing *crimes committed with firearms*, it could be expected that crime rates resulting from *illegal use of firearms* would extremely rise after February 2022.

Nevertheless, police statistics *partly* refute such a presumption. Yes, it is obvious that the number of crimes with weapons has seriously risen for the twelve months of 2022 compared with 2021 or 2020. On the other hand, Ukrainian history knows examples when the number of crimes with weapons was *higher* (for example, in 2014). At the same time, it should also be noted that the number of crimes committed with the use of firearms in 2015 (in the period of the continuing Moscovian invasion to Eastern Ukraine) was less than even for twelve months of 2022 (Figure 71).




Figure 70. Financial fraud (Art. 222)




Figure 71. Crimes committed with the use of firearms

Additionally, it should be noted that in 2022, alongside an increase in the number of crimes committed using firearms, the number of suspects in the same criminal proceedings decreased, which could also raise an issue concerning the effectiveness of LEA activities.

Police statistics of 2022 demonstrate to which extent the number of registered *intentional homicides committed with the use of firearms* has risen:

- in 2021, there were 36 intentional homicides committed using firearms;
- in 2022, the same indicator increased to the level of 247 crimes;
- in 2023, the same indicator increased to the level of 909 crimes;
- in 2024, the same indicator decreased to the level of 295 crimes (Figure 72).




Figure 72. Intentional homicide with the use of firearms

The same could be said about *intentional serious bodily harm committed with firearms*.

Here, it should be noted that, on one hand, 2022 has brought a bigger number of such crimes.

On the other hand, the 2014 data show the same numbers of crimes even in the absence of full-scaled Moscovian military aggression (*Figure 73*).




Figure 73. Intentional grievous bodily harm committed with the use of firearms

Figure 74 demonstrates the number of *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms and numbers of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings.

On one hand, we can observe a significant increase in *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms as compared with 2021.

On the other one, police statistics for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 demonstrate much bigger numbers of *aggravated robberies* even when Ukrainian society was not so deeply saturated with firearms as in 2022 (*Figure 74*).




Figure 74. Aggravated robbery with the use of firearms

Figure 75 demonstrates data on the number of *crimes committed with the use of explosives* and the numbers of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (*Figure 75*).




Figure 75. Crimes with the use of explosives

Here, it can be concluded that crimes committed with the use of explosives have indicate a dualistic trend: 1) the number or crimes increased (63 crimes in 2023, 86 crimes in 2024); 2) the number of criminal proceedings with suspects decreased (14 proceedings in 2023, 18 proceedings in 2024).

The saturation of Ukrainian society with firearms and an increase in numbers of military men in the country is used by organized crime groups which commit crimes not only with the use of firearms but also with the use of military or police uniform.

Here, it should also be stressed on one aspect of post-war life of any state. It is not only about social rehabilitation of former soldiers who directly participated in military actions but also potentially possible criminal activity of persons with post-war traumatic disorders where some of them will not find themselves in post-war society.

Figure 76 demonstrates trends in different crimes committed with firearms and explosives *in comparison*.

Here, we can conclude that if crimes with the use of explosives and aggravated robberies with the use of firearms largely increased (in absolute numbers), nevertheless, most crimes committed with firearms are *intentional homicides* (Figure 76).




Figure 76. Different crimes committed with the use of firearms

Crimes against Peace, Security of Mankind and International Legal order (War Crimes).

According to official data of the Office of General Prosecutor, as of 7 August 2022, the Ukrainian authorities were investigating almost 26 thousand criminal cases of suspected war crimes committed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

In 2023, the number of war crimes increased 246 times as compared to 2021 (62128 crimes). In 2023, the number of crimes was mostly the same (62667 crimes). However, in 2024, the number of war crimes decreased two times as compared to the previous year (*Figure 77*).




Figure 77. War crimes

Sex Crimes. As far as *sex crimes* are concerned, the number of mentioned crimes decreased significantly, as could be expected from wartime society. At the same time, we have the lowest level of sex crimes in the ten-year history of crime prevention in Ukraine (*Figure 78*).

Moreover, in December 2022, there were only 2 sex crimes registered in Ukraine: 621 sex crimes for the period of eleven months of 2022, and 623 sex crimes for the period of twelve months of 2022.




Figure 78. Sex crimes (2013 - 2024)

It is obvious that 2021 brought many restrictions concerned with the COVID pandemics which led to the closing of all nightclubs, discos and restaurants where sex offences were often committed. Nevertheless, the number of sex crimes registered in 2021 was one of the highest in the previous ten years of crime prevention. However, the number of sex crimes increased to 947 in 2023 with further decrease in 2024 (872 crimes).

At the same time, restrictions imposed due to the wartime period led to a rapid decrease in the crimes of rape in Ukrainian society. The beginning of the War led to a rapid decrease in rapes (406 rapes in 2021, 250 rapes in 2022). However, 450 rapes were registered in 2023, and 410 rapes were registered in 2024 (*Figure 79*).

Crimes against National Security. No less interesting is official statistics of *crimes against national security* for 2013-2024

In 2013, as many as 8 crimes against national security were registered, in which only *one* criminal proceeding had a *concrete suspect*. The rest were so-called “*factual*” criminal proceedings. That is, the ratio between all cases and cases with concrete suspects was 8.

Here, we have visual additional – current *criminological* – evidence of the *anti-state orientation* of the political regime in Ukraine that was overthrown in 2014. A big country in the centre of Europe with great

potential, having a dangerous neighbour to the East, could not have such performance indicators of the Security Service of Ukraine and other LEA.




Figure 79. Rape (2013 - 2024)

Immediately after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia and before the start of a full-scale military invasion of Russia in 2022 – and regardless of which President was in power – both the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with suspicion had the same ratio (Figure 80).




Figure 80. Crimes against national security

Crimes in the Sphere of Protection of State Secrets, Inviolability of State Borders, Provision of Conscription and Mobilization. It was clearly expected that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion would bring a serious increase in the numbers of military forces of Ukraine and transportation of military units within Ukrainian territory.

Consequently, it was clearly expected that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion would bring an increase in the numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization*.

As a result, as we can observe, the number of the above crimes in 2022 is 2,6 times bigger as compared with 2021. However, the number of the above crimes in 2023 is 2,3 times bigger as compared with 2022 (1000, 2624 and 6279 crimes correspondingly) (Figure 81).

A special look should be paid to the crime of *illegal trafficking of persons across the state border of Ukraine* (Article 332 of the Criminal Code).




Figure 81. Crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization

The police registered only 327 such crimes in 2021. However, the War stimulated a rapid increase in such crimes when 1225 crimes were registered in 2022. Moreover, 2301 crimes were registered in 2023, and 3106 crimes were registered in 3106.




Figure 82. Illegal trafficking of persons across the state border

Crimes against Justice. During the War, *crimes against justice* have mostly gone into the shadows in Ukraine. Police statistics demonstrate a rapid decrease in crimes against justice (more than two times as compared with 2021) although we tend to analyse such a decrease in the light of factual sabotage of the LEA in registering such crimes: 7198 crimes in 2021, 3663 crimes in 2022, 5308 crimes in 2023, and 7369 crimes in 2024 (Figure 83).




Figure 83. Crimes against justice




Figure 84. Crimes against justice: ratio between crimes and notifications

Intentional Non-Execution of the Court Decisions. *Non-execution of court decisions* remains a chronic problem of the Ukrainian justice system, which was repeatedly noted by the Council of Europe and the ECtHR.

If 2021 was an exception, then during the entire period of 2013-2024, the number of criminal proceedings opened under Article 382 of the Criminal Code, fluctuated at approximately the same level, having reached the highest position in 2019 (4212 registered crimes against justice), after which the number of registered crimes against justice of the mentioned type started to consistently decrease.

In 2023, the police registered 2065 crimes. The next year, the police registered even more crimes (3537).

On the other hand, applying the classic approach that crime within certain limits (both upper and lower) is a *normal* social phenomenon, one can conclude about the extent to which the 2022 Moscovian aggression has *hit* the justice system in Ukraine, significantly destroying what had been worked on for years both Presidents of Ukraine, legislators, executive power, international and national experts, international and national NGOs (*Figure 85*).




Figure 85. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision

However, the number of crimes registered in 2022 indicates the objective and obvious priorities of wartime society, and here we have a *dualistic trend*.

On the one hand, we have a record low number of registered crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code, where such a few registered crimes do *not* at all indicate an improvement in the situation in the field of execution of court decisions.

On the other hand, we have an interesting situation.

Thus, since 2017, there has been a consistent trend of decreasing the ratio between the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects. That is, there were reasonable suspicions, and we assume that there were grounds for them. That is, the criminal justice system began functioning better.

Since 2022, there has been a sharp upward jump in this indicator, which reflects how deeply destabilized the Ukrainian justice system has become due to the escalation of the Moscovian military aggression against Ukraine (*Figure 86*).




Figure 86. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision: ratio between crimes and notifications

Registering crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code has become *much easy*, and even in already registered criminal proceedings, as police statistics prove, there are *no* prospects. Crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code has become much *more latent*.

Independence of judges of any democratic state is one of the pillars of the sustainable development and protection of human rights. Interference in the work of the judiciary is defined as a crime in the Article 376 of the Criminal Code.

Pursuant to the first paragraph of the Article 376, interference in any form with the activities of a judge with the aim of obstructing the performance of his/her official duties or obtaining an unjust decision shall be punishable by a fine of one thousand to four thousand tax-free minimum incomes, or correctional labour for up to two years, or probationary supervision for up to three years.

Pursuant to the second paragraph of the Article 376, the same actions, if they prevented the prevention of a criminal offence or detention of the person who committed it, or were committed by a person using his/her official position shall be punishable by deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to five years, or probationary supervision for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.

In the light of the numerous complaints of Ukrainian judges on interference in their independence, it is very surprising that in 2019 there were 168 crimes registered with zero criminal proceedings with the concrete suspects.

In 2020, there were only 143 crimes with 2 suspects.

In 2021, there were only 122 crimes with no suspects.

In 2022, there were only 64 crimes with 2 suspects.

In 2023, there were only 102 crimes with no suspects.

Finally, in 2024, there were only 98 crimes with 2 suspects.

To sum up, for the last six years, 697 actions were declared as crimes of interference in the work of the judiciary. However, only 6 criminal proceedings of the last four years had concrete suspects.

The answer could lie in two areas. First, it can be concerned with the absence of the proper investigations by the corresponding LEAs. Second, it could be concerned with the false evaluation of the conflict situations by the judges who, as usual, initiate such criminal proceedings.

These crimes are not latent as compared to other crimes. Therefore, the key may lie in proper evaluation of situation by judges to avoid stigmatising with the label of ‘crime’ the actions which could be of a conflict nature during the court proceeding or concerned with sometimes emotional expression of thoughts by parties during the trial.




Figure 87. Interference in the work of the judiciary

Crimes against Public Services. Here, we provide an analysis of the police statistics related to Section XVII of the Criminal Code (“*Criminal offences in the area of official and professional activity related to the provision of public services*”), which are following: abuse of authority or office (Article 364), abuse of power by an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 364-1), excess of authority or official powers by a law enforcement officer (Article 365), abuse of power by persons providing public services (Article 365-2), forgery in office (Article 366), neglect of official duty (Article 367), accepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official (Article 368), (unlawful enrichment (Article 368-2), bribery of an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 368-3), abuse of influence (Article 369-2), provocation of bribery (Article 370) and others.

A significant decrease in *crimes against public services* points to the fact that most of such crimes have gone into the shadows (Figure 88).




Figure 88. Crimes against public services

The police statistics is the following:

- 18330 crimes were registered in 2021 (5874 criminal proceedings with suspects);
- 11617 crimes were registered in 2022 (4355 criminal proceedings with suspects);
- 14820 crimes were registered in 2023 (6048 criminal proceedings with suspects);
- 16820 crimes were registered in 2024 (7682 criminal proceedings with suspects);

Crimes against public services are very latent ones by nature but the 2022 Moscovian military invasion

made them *less latent*, which is surprising (*Figure 89*).




Figure 89. Crimes against public services: ratio between registered crimes and notifications

In 2022, crimes of receiving a bribe have also gone into the shadows: 1566 registered crimes in 2021, and 988 registered crimes (*Figure 90*).




Figure 90. Receiving a bribe

A crime of *bribery* reflects a *dualistic trend* – a decrease in registered ‘white-collar’ crimes and an increase in the ratio between registered crimes and the suspects in related criminal proceedings (*Figure 91*).




Figure 91. Receiving a bribe: ratio between registered crimes and notifications

Corporate Raiding. In the general structure of criminality in Ukraine, a special place is occupied with crimes concerned with *corporate raiding*.

Here, we focus attention on two articles of the Criminal Code: *obstruction of legitimate economic activity* (Article 206) and *illegal seizure of property of an enterprise, institution, or organisation* (Article 206-2).

Firstly, it should be stressed that the mentioned articles are *not* concerned only with activities of big corporations. Moreover, as practice shows, they are used for the aims of prevention of illegal “*conquests*” of *small legal entities*.

Secondly, it should be stressed that Ukraine is a big agricultural country, which supplies food to many states of the European Union. Ukraine is one of the three largest exporters of agricultural products to the EU (the USA and Brazil occupy the first places). According to the European Commission’s statistics, Ukraine has supplied production to the EU by 7 billion euros.

Therefore, the EU is interested in a *transparent and stable agricultural market* in Ukraine, which is important from the point of view of safety of products and minimizing money-laundering in the agricultural sector. At the same time, one of the most dangerous problems both for Ukrainian justice and the agricultural market is the problem of *corporate raiding*.

Of course, this is an issue *mostly of peacetime*, but at the same time, the War also exacerbates this issue as much as possible. If, in peacetime, national and local *quasi-elites* were highly interested in the existence of the *permanent* phenomenon of corporate raiding in Ukraine, then during the 2022 Moscovian military aggression this phenomenon hid even more in the twilight.

Every year the spring-summer-autumn news from Ukraine demonstrated numerous examples of corporate raiding of lands, fields, enterprises, utility premises, agricultural machinery, plants, factories etc., which is often “supported” by violent actions and the use of firearms.

But what about police statistics?

Unfortunately, police statistics say *nothing* about corporate raiding in Ukraine. As a result, it *seems* that there is *no* corporate raiding in Ukraine.

Instead of corporate raiding, there is only a Soviet-style shaped ‘*unauthorised action*’ (Article 356 of the Criminal Code) which provides punishment for “*unauthorised action, that is doing anything contrary to the rules established by law, where the lawfulness of such acts is challenged by an individual citizen, an enterprise, institution or organisation, and where such acts caused any substantial damage to the interests of a citizen, state and public interests, or interests of the owner*”.

Let us analyse an issue of the corporate raiding in Ukraine in the light of the police statistics.

Police statistics for the last 10 years indicate that, on average, for the period 2013-2021, notes of suspicion were handed in almost 40% of *all* criminal proceedings open in Ukraine.

The same indicator for 2022 is 36,5%.

At the same time, the same indicator under Article 206 of the Criminal Code for the period of 2013-2021 is 3,64%. The same indicator for 2022 is 3,57%.

A similar indicator under Article 206-2 of the Criminal Code for the period 2014 – 2021 is 10,04% and 6,66% for the period of twelve months of 2022.

Having analysed the percentage of criminal proceedings under Articles 206 and 206-2 of the Criminal Code (in light of the total number of criminal proceedings), we receive *disappointing* conclusions, especially considering that, firstly, these crimes are *not* latent (because of the activities of the victims), and, secondly, the police investigators and prosecutors ‘*drive*’ the most crimes of corporate raiding under simple ‘*unauthorised action*’.

Here, we have another clear example that the presence in the Criminal Code related prohibitions does *not* guarantee that *quasi-elites* will be interested in restricting themselves in the use of such an illegal source of income.

As a conclusion to this part of our criminological analysis, we should point out that the problem of corporate raiding is a ‘*face*’ of a broader problem of *corruption* in the field of justice and the LEA activities (Figure 92, Figure 93).




Figure 92. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings from total number of related criminal proceedings

Here, we would like to take a look at the percentage of criminal proceedings with suspects.

Corporate raiding is a crime where a victim clearly defines a perpetrator. Therefore, such crimes cannot be defined as latent ones.

Criminal proceedings with suspects occupied 39,8% in 2023 and 39,5% in 2024 in general number of all criminal proceedings registered. However, criminal proceedings with suspects in crimes of obstruction of legitimate economic activity occupied only 3,2% and 3,5% in general number of all criminal proceedings registered pursuant to Article 206 of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, criminal proceedings with suspects in crimes of illegal seizure of property of an enterprise, institution, or organisation occupied only 25% and 7,1% in general number of all criminal proceedings registered pursuant to Article 206 of the Criminal Code. The answer lies in systematic failures in investigation of such crimes because of the corruption in the LEA.




Figure 93. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings with suspects from total number of criminal proceedings with suspects

Hooliganism. No less interesting for the aims of the analysis of the criminological situation in Ukraine is the crime of *hooliganism* (according to Article 296 of the Criminal Code – “*a serious disturbance of public order based on motives of explicit disrespect to community in a most outrageous or exceptionally cynical manner*”) which can be used as an example of impacts of harsh wartime restrictions with curfews, military and the police patrols as well as roadblocks on *normal* social life.

Generally concluding, criminal acts of hooliganism have had a permanent trend to decrease for the last ten years when the 2021 restrictions resulting from the COVID pandemic should also be noted.

In 2022, a particular decrease of acts of hooliganism should be considered because of the next Moscovian military invasion. If, in 2021, acts of hooliganism were widely prevented by closing public spaces (shopping centres, cinemas, public transport etc.), the COVID pandemic was almost ‘*forgotten*’ by the general population at the end of February 2022. Accordingly, the end of February 2022 has led to harsher physical restrictions on *possible* actions aimed at violation of public order (*Figure 94*).




Figure 94. Hooliganism: registered crimes and notifications

In general, 1939 crimes of hooliganism were registered in 2021, 1133 crimes in 2022, 1322 in 2023, and 1434 crimes in 2024.

On the other hand, the number of acts of hooliganism almost disappeared from social life in February-March 2022, has appeared again in April 2022 with a trend to further increase.

Correspondingly, such a trend should be considered an indicator of a partial *stabilization* of social life in Ukraine, mostly in areas far from the front line.

Certainly, the last two months of 2022 will prove (or not) such a hypothesis. At least data for 2022 has given reasonable grounds to shape it in the above form.

On the other hand, one more conclusion could be drawn from the above situation described. Yes, the number of acts of hooliganism dropped to a particular extent due to the harshest social control measures in Ukrainian history. For example, comparative analysis of crimes of hooliganism for ten months of 2021 and 2022 shows that the number of detected acts of hooliganism decreased.

Nevertheless, the drop was not too insignificant to make a statement that the harshest police restrictions have resulted in decreasing such acts to a minimum level that could be expected from a point of view of proponents of harsher police control over society.

Smuggling. Smuggling from Ukraine to the rest of Europe has been an obvious problem for the stability of public order in the EU for a long time. Therefore, *crimes of smuggling* are no fewer interesting cases for researching the impact of the War because they reflect the state of *protection of the borders* of Ukraine, which, in its turn, reflects the general potential of the *State* to keep its territory safe.

The Ukrainian police statistics show that the crime of smuggling had occupied a permanent segment in the general structure of the Ukrainian police until 2022.

In the period of 2016-2021, there has been an increase in detected crimes of smuggling with its highest point of 135 crimes in 2021 (*Figure 95*).




Figure 95. Smuggling: registered crimes and notifications

In 2021, 151 criminal proceedings were registered. However, 71 criminal proceedings were registered in 2023, 125 proceedings were registered in 2023, and 151 proceedings registered in 2024.

Here, it should be noted that in 2018, the Criminal Code was supplemented with Article 201-1 according to the Law “*On the introduction of amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the preservation of Ukrainian forests and the prevention of the illegal export of unprocessed timber*” which has stated a criminal liability for *smuggling of timber*. Therefore, in this paper, data for 2020 – 2024 also reflect the numbers of both crimes of smuggling – the ‘*classical*’ one and the *smuggling of timber*.

Additionally, we would like to make a conclusion that seems to be of great importance in the context of analysis of smuggling in a broader context of Ukrainian criminality.

For the period of 2013-2021, the average ratio between all detected crimes of smuggling (including so-called ‘*factual cases*’) and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 2,25.

In 2022, the same indicator increased to 3,74 (that is 1,7 times higher).

Considering the fact that crimes of smuggling are often concerned with concrete persons who are crossing the border with smuggled goods, such a state of things poses reasonable questions concerning the effectiveness of the LEA.

Moreover, in the wartime period when all law-enforcement bodies operate in a state of a heightened alertness, such a gap between the mentioned indicators seems to be of an *artificial nature* (Figure 96).




Figure 96. Smuggling: ratio between crimes and notifications

Here, we would also like to analyse crimes of *smuggling of drugs*.

Drug-related offences have already been analysed in a separate chapter of this paper. Nevertheless, here, a focus is made not on drugs but mostly on *smuggling*. Therefore, both crimes – smuggling and smuggling of drugs – are discussed together in a broader context of *immovability of the state borders of Ukraine* in the wartime period.

The first conclusion that could be drawn from statistics is that the number of detected crimes of smuggling of drugs decreased (183 criminal proceedings in 2021, 115 proceedings in 2022, 145 proceedings in 2023, 201 proceedings in 2024) (Figure 97, Figure 98).




Figure 97. Smuggling of drugs: criminal proceedings




Figure 98. Smuggling of drugs: criminal proceedings with suspects

As in the previous example with smuggling, in the *period of 2013-2021*, the average ratio between detected crimes (so called ‘*factual*’) and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 1,55. In 2022-2024, the same indicator increased to 1,9 (Figure 99).




Figure 99. Smuggling of drugs: ratio between crimes and notifications

Human Trafficking: “New Markets, New Perspectives”. According to general stereotypes, which are *not* far from reality, Ukraine has traditionally been used as a *transit country* for the aims of human trafficking. In its recent judgment of 16 February 2021 in «*V.C.L. and A.N. v. the United Kingdom*» (*applications nos. 77587/12 and 74603/12*), the European Court of Human Rights pointed at the similarities in the route to the United Kingdom taken by the victims of human trafficking where *Ukraine* was defined as a *transit country* to Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany and France.

What is stressed in declarations of many political leaders from the EU, Ukraine and other Europeans states that the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine has handed the future of many Ukrainian women and children over to criminal elements because of the chaos in Ukraine that took place in the first period of the 2022 War.

The author's personal sources prove that some humanistic initiatives of several NGOs and individuals on bringing Ukrainian refugees to new homes or at least safe places in the states of the EU were halted because new 'opportunities' of sheltering were proposed by persons who can be arguably suspected in human trafficking and forced labour.

On the other hand, in academic sources, the authors rightly assert that shaped in mass-media imagination about '*an innocent victim*' of human trafficking, in fact, does not meet the reality (Haverkamp, Rita (2019). *Victims of Human Trafficking: Consideration from a Crime Prevention Perspective*, in '*What is Wrong with Human Trafficking? Critical Perspectives on the Law*', R. Haverkamp, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Lernestedt (Eds.). London: Hart, 280pp.).

Accordingly, the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine has moved the concept of '*innocent victim*' of human trafficking more far from the reality.

It is generally accepted that human trafficking is mostly a *well-organized criminal activity* which demands different forms of criminal '*cooperation*' among perpetrators *in different border states*. At the same time, with the beginning of the 2022 War, trying to control the wave of refugees, the Ukrainian Government severely restricted border crossing for *males* while *males* were mostly involved in this criminal activity.

On the other hand, a new slave market was opened in occupied Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine, obviously under informal authorization and control of the Moscovian regime. There is mass evidence of arbitrary arrests of not only military men but also civilians, with further putting them into a state of forced military service. Moreover, there were further informal demands of a large sum of money for each person (up to 30,000 US dollars) with corresponding formal letters from Russian officials that "*N. resisted the Special Military Operation conducted by the Military Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Therefore, N. will be deprived of freedom for an unpredictable period until the Special Military Operation ends*".

As far as Ukraine is concerned, police statistics show that a period of 2013 – 2016 was stable in the aspect of numbers of registered crimes of human trafficking as well as of numbers of suspects in related criminal proceedings.

In 2017, there was a rapid increase in human trafficking crimes, which slowly ended in 2021. The Ukrainian police statistics say, even in 2022, 2023 and 2024, the average number of crimes was almost the same as it was in 2013 – 2016.

However, one can conclude that the War impacted the crime rates significantly (232 crimes in 2021, 133 crimes in 2022, 147 crimes in 2023, 105 crimes in 2024) (Figure 100). At the same time, we can argue concerning a factual *increase* in THB cases considering the fact that 6,5 million Ukrainians left the country and 'created' new '*opportunities*' for human traffickers.

However, it is difficult to say how human trafficking was affected by the 2022 Moscovian invasion. On one hand, the number of registered THB crimes decreased to *zero* immediately after the Russian military forces crossed the Ukrainian border. On the other hand, serious concerns arise around the fact that THB cases continue to be registered in the light of closed borders, police checks, curfews and hundreds of military and police roadblocks.

At the same time, it should be pointed that 133 THB crimes in 2022, 147 THB crimes in 2023 and 105 THB crimes in 2024 are more than *insufficient* considering 6,5 million Ukrainian refugees, which could lead to the conclusion that something is obviously *wrong* with the police intelligence in the sphere of THB prevention as well as with intelligence of the Ukrainian border service. It could be said that THB crimes are *more latent* ones than the LEA officials declare.




Figure 100. Human trafficking: crimes and notifications

The factor of *corruption* should also be considered – both in the police and border service. There were many reports in numerous mass media that a ‘*price*’ for illegally crossing the Ukrainian border varies from 2000 to 5000 US dollars.

The situation with ‘*satellite crimes*’ is different.

Firstly, let us demonstrate the official statistics of a crime of *creating or running brothels and procuring*.

The period of 2013-2021 could be described as a permanent decrease in the mentioned crimes where the War ‘*cut*’ corresponding crime trends. Even considering an increase in this type of crime in 2023 (129 registered crimes), the next year has indicated a decrease (79 crimes) (*Figure 101*).




Figure 101. Creating or running brothels and procuring

Comparative analysis of the police statistics proves the trend of decreasing numbers of crimes of running brothels, which are traditionally considered as ‘*shadow crimes*’ or ‘*satellite crimes*’ in relation to THB crimes.

The same could also be said about a crime of *pimping or engaging the person in prostitution*. Even considering an increase in this type of crime in 2023 (348 registered crimes), the next year has indicated a decrease (244 crimes) (*Figure 102*).




Figure 102. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution

The War cut the official rates of crime of engaging minors in criminal activity (Article 304 of the Criminal Code) (122 crimes in 2021, 79 crimes in 2022, 73 crimes in 2023, 91 crimes in 2024) (Figure 103).




Figure 103. Engaging minors in criminal activity (Art. 304)

At the same time, it is hard to say that the War cut the official rates of crime of use of a minor for begging (Article 150-1 of the Criminal Code) (4 crimes in 2021, 3 crimes in 2022, 3 crimes in 2023, 1 crime in 2024) (Figure 104).




Figure 104. The use of a minor for begging (Art. 150-1)

The same could be conceded in respect of the official rates of crime of use exploitation of children (Article 150 of the Criminal Code) (4 crimes in 2021, 3 crimes in 2022, 3 crimes in 2023, 1 crime in 2024) (Figure 105).




Figure 105. Exploitation of children (Art. 150)

At the same time, it is hard to say that the War cut the official rates of crime of use of a minor for begging (Article 150-1 of the Criminal Code) (zero crimes in 2021, 1 crime in 2022, 1 crime in 2023, zero crimes in 2024).

Crime trends in Ukraine for the last ten years are a good example to prove the common social nature of THB crimes and ‘satellite (‘shadow’) crimes’ discussed above. The common feature of all the mentioned crime trends is the fact that they are changing almost the same way (Figure 106, Figure 107).




Figure 106. THB crimes and “satellite” crimes

Analysing the problem of human trafficking, we guess it is necessary to have one more look at the problem but from another perspective. As we mentioned earlier, during the War, the number of crimes of illegal trafficking of persons across the state border of Ukraine increased drastically.

At the same time, the number of THB crimes decreased. Moreover, the number of such crimes was not very impressive in the light of the official police statistics.

However, both mentioned types of crimes are strictly concerned with the state border. In the first case, trafficking of persons across the state border is a compulsory element of crime. In the second case, most persons in Ukraine are trafficked through the state border.




Figure 107. Suspects in THB crimes and “satellite” crimes




Figure 108. THB crimes and notifications in THB crimes




Figure 109. Creating or running brothels and procuring: crimes and notifications




Figure 110. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution: crimes and notifications

So, all perpetrators aim at the easiest points on the border to cross. They are looking for the most appropriate ‘assistants’ for their criminal activity, including corrupted officers from the Army and the State Border Guards Service. Demand generates supply: they do find such corrupted officers.

Therefore, the question arises: why the numbers of illegal trafficking of persons across the state border are so large as compared with the THB crimes?

One can argue that it is much easier to transport the unpretentious males who wish to be trafficked and who are not victims, as compared with mostly female victims of human trafficking. Such an argument should be considered with no doubt. However, it does not explain the difference in numbers in the mentioned above two types of crimes. Probably, the answer lies around corruption on the border and minimisation of the risks of perpetrators being arrested. The answer could also be concerned with the more latent nature of THB crimes during the War. In any case, if you can create the channel for transportation of males-perpetrators, you can use the same channel for trafficking of female victims of human trafficking. Moreover, the police statistics indicate that the last year, more perpetrators avoided charges for illegal trafficking of males across the border.




Figure 111. THB and the states borders

Law-Enforcement Agencies in the Light of the Police Statistics. Here are presented the numbers of criminal proceedings opened by different law-enforcement agencies, with corresponding analysis.

In 2022, prosecution offices registered 9586 criminal proceedings (7870 criminal proceedings in 2021).

At the same time, the police registered much more criminal proceedings (2022 criminal proceedings in 2022, 44027 criminal proceedings in 2021) (Figure 112).

Tab. 9.

Crimes concerned with illegal crossing the state border of Ukraine

	Illegal trafficking of persons across the state border of Ukraine – Crimes	Illegal trafficking of persons across the state border of Ukraine – Notifications	Human trafficking – Crimes
2021	327	119	232
2022	1225	590	133
2023	2301	1547	147
2024	3106	2093	105




Figure 112. Criminal proceedings opened by Prosecution Service and the Police

The wartime period indicates a clear trend where the Prosecution Office registered fewer criminal proceedings in 2023 (9584 criminal proceedings), and especially in 2024 (7399 criminal proceedings). At the same time the police registered much more criminal proceedings in 2023 (61847 criminal proceedings) and 2024 (65478 criminal proceedings).

Investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) registered many more criminal proceedings in 2022 (11841 criminal proceedings) as compared with 2021 (5035 criminal proceedings) (*Figure 113*).

In contrast, investigators of the tax police registered much fewer criminal proceedings in 2022 (218 criminal proceedings) as compared with 2021 (1324 criminal proceedings) (*Figure 113*).




Figure 113. Criminal proceedings opened by the Security Service and the Tax Police

From the 2023-2024 statistics, it is surprising that the number of criminal proceedings registered by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) decreased after 2022, especially considering the continuous threats from Russia (11841 criminal proceedings in 2022, 11679 criminal proceedings in 2023, and 10956 criminal proceedings in 2024).

At the same time, an increase in criminal proceedings by the tax police demonstrates that the economics has adapted to the wartime conditions with corresponding adaptation of white-collar crime to challenges of the War.

In 2022, investigators of the State Investigation Bureau (DBR) and detectives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) registered approximately the same number of criminal proceedings as in 2021. However, investigators of the State Investigation Bureau (DBR) demonstrated more activities in 2023-2024. They registered 2906 criminal proceedings in 2023 and 4971 criminal proceedings in 2024 (*Figure 114*).




Figure 114. Criminal proceedings opened by the DBR and the NABU

As far as the situation with notifications of suspicions given to suspects in criminal proceedings, police statistics provide us with the following results.

The police investigators decreased the number of notes of suspicion in 2022 (28633 notifications in 2022, 36562 notifications in 2021).

The number of notifications of suspicion given in criminal proceedings opened by prosecutors in 2022 was mostly the same as in 2021 (*Figure 115*).




Figure 115. Criminal proceedings with suspects opened by the Prosecution Service and the Police

The number of notifications of suspicion given in criminal proceedings opened by investigators by the tax police and the Security Service of Ukraine is very controversial in the context of its transformation.

In 2013, both LEAs started with the same numbers of criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicions (*Figure 116*).

In 2023, the differences between them have reached a historical point.

The indicators of the tax police almost reached zero level. At the same time, the indicators of the Security Service of Ukraine reached its historical maximum (*Figure 116*).




Figure 116. Criminal proceedings with suspects opened by the Security Service and by the Tax Police

Indicators of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), as statistics demonstrate, were not significantly impacted by the War. In contrast, indicators of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) increased more than significantly (*Figure 117*).




Figure 117. Criminal proceedings with suspects opened by the DBR and by the NABU

Quality and Quantity of Criminal Investigations during the War. No less interesting is the issue of researching the impact of the War on the indicators of the work of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, where, according to statistical forms, we take as a basis two indicators – the total number of criminal proceedings opened by one or another law enforcement agency (prosecutor's office, the police, security service, tax police, the State Bureau of Investigation, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine), and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects opened by the relevant law enforcement agency.

It can be concluded that during the year of the Moscovian military invasion, the prosecutor's office opened significantly more criminal proceedings (9586 criminal proceedings in 2022, as compared to 7870 criminal proceedings in 2021).

However, the number of criminal proceedings in which suspicion was reported decreased (1420 criminal proceedings in 2021, 1354 criminal proceedings in 2022). However, prosecutors registered 1678 criminal proceedings in 2023 and 1693 criminal proceedings in 2024 (*Figure 118*).




Figure 118. Criminal proceedings opened by Prosecution Service

In 2022, the police registered 39800 criminal proceedings (28633 criminal proceedings with concrete suspects), which is less than in 2021 (44027 criminal proceedings, of which there were 36562 criminal proceedings with suspects). However, the next year the police registered 61847 criminal proceedings, of which there were 51373 criminal proceedings with suspects. In 2024, year the police registered 65478 criminal proceedings, of which there were 56014 criminal proceedings with suspects (*Figure 119*).




Figure 119. Criminal proceedings opened by the Police

At the same time, for obvious reasons, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) registered 11841 criminal proceedings in 2022, while only 5035 criminal proceedings were registered in 2021. The further wartime period demonstrated further slight decrease in a general number of criminal proceedings registered by the Security Service of Ukraine (11679 criminal proceedings in 2023 and 10959 criminal proceedings in 2024). However, there was an increase in criminal proceedings with suspects (4198 criminal proceedings in 2023 and 4258 criminal proceedings in 2024) (*Figure 120*).




Figure 120. Criminal proceedings opened by Security Service

If we discuss the indicators of the tax police, then, for objective reasons, the indicators have reached almost zero level in 2022 (especially criminal proceedings with suspects). However, the next years demonstrated an increase in the number of criminal proceedings registered (945 criminal proceedings in 2023, 1347 criminal proceedings in 2024). However, it appears that the quantity was not supported with the quality: only 192 criminal proceedings in 2023 and 371 criminal proceedings in 2024 had suspects (*Figure 121*).




Figure 121. Criminal proceedings opened by the Tax Police

Since 2017, statistics on the results of crime investigations by investigators of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) started to be published, which show quite indicative results. Thus, despite the annual increase in the number of registered criminal proceedings, the ratio between the total number of cases and cases with suspects increased every year, which proves the thesis of the transformation of the State Bureau of Investigation into a body investigating mainly "factual" cases. At the same time, the War left the indicators at the same level as last year (1341 criminal proceedings in 2021, 1130 criminal proceedings in 2022). At the same time, the beginning of the War further increased the distance between actual criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with specific suspects (672 criminal proceedings with suspects in 2021, 525 criminal proceedings with suspects in 2022, 1053 criminal proceedings with suspects in 2023, and 1661 criminal proceedings with suspects in 2024) (*Figure 122*).

In 2022, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, on the contrary, demonstrated an increase in both the total number of criminal proceedings and the number of criminal proceedings involving suspects. In general, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine has demonstrated stability in both indicators since its establishment, which the war does not seem to have affected. However, the statistics demonstrate a deeper gap between the general number of criminal proceedings and the number of criminal proceedings with suspects (*Figure 123*).




Figure 122. Criminal proceedings opened by the DBR




Figure 123. Criminal proceedings opened by the NABU

Conclusions. Having summarized the above developments presented, we have come to the following conclusions that reflect the 2013-2024 crime trends in Ukraine, heavily impacted with the wartime challenges.

Following up on our conclusions shaped in previously published papers, we have to stress again that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion of Ukraine became *the first full-scale war* in the centre of the European continent after World War II with direct and open participation of the biggest European states which has become an absolutely new broad field for criminological research *on the impacts of a contemporary war on contemporary digital and technological societies*.

The crime trends in wartime Ukraine have become a much more interesting criminological phenomenon for researchers due to the *dualistic nature* of such trends.

The number of crimes committed in Ukraine in 2022 exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021 (321443 crimes). Mass attacks on Ukrainian cities by drones and missiles and destruction of the infrastructure left many people without their homes, incomes, hopes and perspectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that the number of crimes increased significantly in 2023-2024 considering the ruination of all aspects of economic and social life in Ukraine (475595 crimes in 2023, 492479 crimes in 2024). All these factors, including further mass migration of people from frontline areas, increased the crimes rates significantly. In addition, the crime landscape took new forms and characteristics having received the injection of purely wartime crimes (crimes against military service, war crimes and crimes against national security).

It is obviously that all resources of Ukraine have been directed to the needs of the defence of the state from the Moscovian military aggression, including the police. Therefore, it is not surprising that the quality of investigation of crimes and the preventive effect of criminal punishment decreased proportionally. In 2023, there were only 189292 of criminal proceeding with suspects (40% from the total number). In 2024, there were only 194688 of criminal proceeding with suspects (39% from the total number). In contrast, the same indicator for 2021 was 53%. The latter can serve as an indicator of the decreasing effectiveness of the national criminal justice system in the conditions of the wartime challenges and sometimes even chaos.

The War made criminality *more rural* in Ukraine. In 2024, police statistics demonstrated the lowest level of crimes in urban areas (67.6%) and the highest level of crimes in rural areas (28,7%).

The War 'cut' the number of detected *crimes against human life and health*. In 2023, suspects were found only in 36% of criminal proceedings. In 2024, the same indicators dropped to the point of 29%. Only 5% of perpetrators of *intentional homicides* were identified in 2022, 2,8% of perpetrators were identified in 2023, and 1,9% of perpetrators were identified in 2024 that indicates an obvious operational weakness of the national criminal justice system in wartime.

Police statistics on *torture* occupy a very controversial place in the analysis of the general structure of crime in Ukraine. On one hand, systematic torture by the police and prison officers has shaped corresponding views on torture as *practices* in the Ukrainian society and media. The Ukrainian society has a strong view that ill-treatment by the police and prison officers is a *wide-spread phenomenon*. On the other one, the number of officially registered crimes of torture determines many questions concerning the latent nature of this type of crime as well as the effectiveness of investigation of torture by state agents in Ukraine which become known to the society. Additionally, the percentage of dropped criminal proceedings in torture cases stimulates additional questions about the effectiveness of pre-trial investigation of tortures.

Domestic violence also deserves to become an interesting phenomenon of the crime landscape in wartime Ukraine. In the light of the absence of both victims and perpetrators due to mass migration of *potential* victims and participation of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions, crime rates go up.

No less interesting picture one can find in the case of *drug-related crimes*. Even in the light of further escalation of military actions, the state continues focusing even on minor drug crimes. It seems that the mechanism of an artificial 'market' for drug-related crimes, where criminals are often victims at the same time, and where police officers know *who, where and under what conditions* will commit *the next* 'crime', 'should not stand idle' even during the War.

Expectedly, the number of offences against military service (*military crimes*) has also increased significantly in 2022-2024. The police registered 16515 such crimes in 2023 and 66240 in 2024. At the same time the number of criminal proceedings with suspects were very low (2239 and 7398 correspondingly). The main conclusion here is that the number of registered crimes has increased in parallel to the decrease of identified suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings.

While considering *property crimes* in wartime Ukraine, the first hypothesis appears that the absence of properly organized policing *would* lead to a serious increase of the number of property crimes. Nevertheless, the number of recorded property crimes has in fact significantly *decreased* in 2022. The impact of the War on property crimes is more than obvious: 158729 property crimes in 2021, 113137 property crimes in 2022, 178902 property crimes in 2023, and 132910 property crimes in 2024. The same way the War impacted the practices of crimes of *theft, car thefts, robberies, aggravated robberies* and *racketeering*.

In contrast, crimes of *fraud* in 2022 demonstrated absolutely another trend: the number of crimes of fraud in 2022 (32086) appeared much bigger than in 2021 (23847). Moreover, the police registered 82609 crimes of fraud in 2022 and 64978 crimes of fraud in 2024

It was predictable that the number of *economic offences* would be decreased (5469 crimes in 2022). However, perpetrators adapted to wartime conditions, and crime rates almost reached the level of 2021. Moreover, the 'adaptation process' was more than effective. As the example, we can consider the crime of *legalisation (laundering) of property proceeding from crime*: 348 crimes in 2020, 395 crimes in 2021, 437

crimes in 2022, 969 crimes in 2023, and 1132 crimes in 2024.

While analysing *crimes committed with firearms*, it could be expected that crime rates resulting from *illegal use of firearms* would extremely rise after February 2022. Nevertheless, police statistics *partly* refute such a presumption. For example, in 2021, there were 36 intentional homicides committed using firearms. In 2022, the same indicator increased to the level of 247 crimes. In 2023, the same indicator increased to the level of 909 crimes. However, in 2024, the same indicator decreased to the level of 295 crimes.

In contrast, the War increased the number of *crimes committed with the use of explosives*. These crimes have indicated a dualistic trend: 1) the number of crimes increased; 2) the number of criminal proceedings with suspects decreased.

As far as *sex crimes* are concerned, the number of mentioned crimes decreased significantly in 2022, as could be expected from the wartime society. However, the number of rapes reached the pre-War indicators in 2023. At the same time, we had the lowest level of sex crimes in the ten-year history of crime prevention in Ukraine. Moreover, in December 2022, there were only 2 sex crimes registered in Ukraine: 621 sex crimes for the period of eleven months of 2022, and 623 sex crimes for the period of twelve months of 2022. The same can be said about the crimes of *rape*: the beginning of the War led to a rapid decrease in rapes (406 rapes in 2021, 250 rapes in 2022). However, 450 rapes were registered in 2023, and 410 rapes were registered in 2024.

No less interesting is official statistics of *crimes against national security*. In 2022, the LEA registered five times more crimes against national security as compared to the whole period of 2013-2021. However, the number of such crimes dropped almost three times in 2023.

It was clearly expected that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion would bring an increase in the numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization*. As a result, the number of the above crimes in 2022 is 2,6 times bigger as compared with 2021. The number of the above crimes in 2023 is 2,3 times bigger as compared with 2022 (1000, 2624 and 6279 crimes correspondingly).

Economic offences also demonstrate how crime has adapted to wartime conditions. In 2022, the number of crimes against public services decreased 1,6 times. However, the number of these crimes increased 1,3 times in 2023. Moreover, the number of these crimes increased 1,1 times in 2024 as compared to 2023. In general, the number of these crimes increased 1,1 times in 2024 as compared to 2022.

As far as *human trafficking* is concerned, 133 crimes in 2022, 147 crimes in 2023 and 105 crimes were registered in 2024. These numbers are more than *insufficient* considering 6,5 million Ukrainian refugees, which could lead to the conclusion that something is obviously *wrong* with the police intelligence in the sphere of THB prevention as well as with intelligence of the Ukrainian border service. It could be said that THB crimes are *more latent* ones than the LEA officials declare.

As far as *the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies* is concerned, they provided different indicators depending on type of crimes they registered and investigated.

The importance of *policing* increased in the wartime society. The wartime period indicates a clear trend where the Prosecution Office registered fewer criminal proceedings in 2023, and especially in 2024. At the same time, the police registered much more criminal proceedings in 2023 and 2024.

It is surprising that the number of criminal proceedings registered by *the Security Service of Ukraine* decreased after 2022, especially considering the increasing threats from Russia. At the same time, an increase in criminal proceedings by the tax police demonstrates that the economics has adapted to the wartime conditions, with a corresponding adaptation of white-collar crime to the challenges of the War. For obvious reasons, the Security Service of Ukraine registered 2,4 times more criminal proceedings in 2022 as compared to 2021. The further wartime period demonstrated further slight decrease in a general number of criminal proceedings registered by the Security Service of Ukraine. However, there was an increase in criminal proceedings with suspects.

The tax police registered 4,3 times criminal proceedings more in 2023 as compared to 2022. In 2024, the tax police registered 1,3 times criminal proceedings more as compared to 2023. However, it appears that the quantity was not supported with the quality: only 10% of criminal proceedings registered by the tax police in 2022 had suspects (20% and 27% correspondingly for 2023 and 2024).

Ягунов Д. В. Московська воєнна агресія: вплив війни на злочинність в Україні у світлі статистики за 2013-2024 роки

У статті розглядаються тенденції злочинності в Україні у 2013-2024 роках, які зазнали змін та викликів у зв'язку з воєнним вторгненням Росії до України у 2022 році. Стаття демонструє, що кількість злочинів, скоєних в Україні у 2022, 2023 та 2024 роках, перевищила кількість злочинів, скоєних у 2021 році. Автор доходить висновку, що безперервні атаки російських безпілотників і ракет на українські міста та руйнування інфраструктури залишили багатьох людей без домівок, доходів, надій та перспектив. Тому кількість злочинів значно зросла у 2023-2024 роках, враховуючи руйнування всіх аспектів економічного та соціального життя в Україні. Усі ці фактори, включаючи подальшу масову міграцію людей з прифронтових територій, значно підвищили рівень злочинності. Крім того, криміногенний ландшафт набув нових форм і характеристик, отримавши «ін'єкцію» суто воєнних злочинів (злочинів проти військової служби, воєнних злочинів та злочинів проти основ національної безпеки). Наприклад, у 2022 році правоохоронні органи зареєстрували в п'ять разів більше злочинів проти національної безпеки, ніж за весь період 2013-2021 років. Автор доводить, що московське воєнне вторгнення призвело до зростання кількості злочинів у сфері охорони державної таємниці, недоторканності державних кордонів, забезпечення призову та мобілізації. Крім того, після лютого 2022 року зросла кількість злочинів, пов'язаних із незаконним використанням вогнепальної зброї. Війна також збільшила кількість злочинів, скоєних із застосуванням вибухових речовин. Ці злочини свідчать про дуалістичну тенденцію: 1) кількість злочинів зросла; 2) кількість кримінальних проваджень з підозрюваними зменшилася. Автор послідовно доводить, що всі матеріальні та людські ресурси України були спрямовані на потреби оборони держави від московської воєнної агресії, в тому числі й поліція. Тому пропорційно знизилася якість розслідування злочинів і превентивний ефект кримінального покарання. Війна зробила злочинність більш сільською та «урізала» кількість виявлених злочинів проти життя та здоров'я людини. Автор наголошує, що статистика катувань займає дуже суперечливе місце в аналізі загальної структури злочинності в Україні. Кількість офіційно зареєстрованих злочинів катувань визначає багато питань щодо латентності цього виду злочинів, а також ефективності розслідування катувань представниками держави, які стають відомими суспільству. Водночас у 2022 році значно зменшилася кількість злочинів на сексуальному ґрунті, які можна було очікувати у суспільстві, що перебуває у стані війни. У статті також розглянуто тенденції домашнього насильства, яке стало цікавим феноменом кримінального ландшафту України воєнного часу. В умовах відсутності як жертв, так і кривдників через масову міграцію потенційних жертв та участь багатьох потенційних кривдників у військових діях, рівень злочинності зростає. Не менш цікава картина спостерігається у випадку злочинів, пов'язаних з наркотиками. Навіть в умовах подальшої ескалації військових дій держава продовжує приділяти увагу навіть незначним наркозлочинам, що порушує питання про ефективність та дієвість запобігання злочинності під час війни. Розглядаючи майнові злочини в Україні у воєнний час, перша гіпотеза полягає в тому, що відсутність належним чином організованої охорони правопорядку призведе до значного зростання кількості майнових злочинів. Однак кількість майнових злочинів значно зменшилася. На противагу цьому, шахрайство демонструє зовсім іншу тенденцію. Крім того, економічні злочини та злочини «білих комірців» також демонструють, як злочинність адаптувалася до умов воєнного часу.

Ключові слова: Україна, запобігання злочинності, тенденції злочинності, поліцейська статистика, кримінологія, воєнна агресія Росії проти України 2022 року, повномасштабна агресія Росії проти України, поліція, поліцейська діяльність, органи правопорядку.