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INDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AND THE PROSPECTS OF INDO-UKRAINIAN COOPERATION

Numerous publications by well-known Ukrainian and foreign scientists and journalists are devoted to the issue of India's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. The article presents a brief analysis of these publications and, relying on the results of previous Indological studies, focuses attention on the main aspects of the identified problem. It is emphasized that India's position on the issue of the war in Ukraine is based on the principles of its traditional foreign policy concept – preservation of clear neutrality. Official New Delhi sees the war in Ukraine not as a confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv, and not even as a war between the West and the Russian Federation, but as part of a wider rivalry between the West and China. Permanent rivalry and aggravation of relations with China requires India to maintain multifaceted relations with the Russian Federation in order to support its security capabilities, to continue military-technical and trade-economic cooperation in order to maintain its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Opportunities and prospective directions of Ukrainian-Indian relations with the aim of improving bilateral relations and strengthening Indian support for our country in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war were considered by the authors.

As a result of the conducted research, the need for improvement directions, forms and mechanisms of Ukrainian-Indian cooperation was revealed. The work presents specific proposals for improving Indo-Ukrainian-Indian relations and developing cooperation from the point of view of analysing India's position on the problems of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the importance and authority of this state in solving international issues, and the positive historical experience of the development of bilateral relations in the past. The proposals and ideas offered by the authors regarding the development and improvement of bilateral contacts, can be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing the National Strategy for the Development Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of India.

Keywords: *India's foreign policy, Ukraine, India, Russia, Russian-Ukrainian war, Indo-Ukrainian relations.*

Formulation of the problem. At the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century was a rapid growth of the international authority of the Republic of India. There was an extremely successful transition of India from the status of a post-colonial country to the format of a regional leader and a candidate for the leading centres of power in modern geopolitics, with whom such world leaders as the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, etc. must be reckoned with.

The Russian-Ukrainian war has a negative effect on the balance of power in many regions of the world, that is clearly observed on the example of Asian countries. India's position on the problems and issues of the Russian-Ukrainian war is extremely important and significant. Therefore, in relations with India, Ukraine should modernize its approaches to cooperation, appealing to the fundamental principles of India's foreign policy strategy and doctrine, which can be implemented in the development of the National Strategy for the Development of Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and India.

Last researchers' analysis of the problem. India's position in the Russian-Ukrainian war has been very actively discussed recently in the Ukrainian mass media and Internet publications. The speeches of Ukrainian and Indian diplomats and political figures are devoted to this issue, especially speeches and interviews of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba [9], Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine E. Japarova [3], Prime Minister of India N. Modi [1], Minister of Foreign Affairs of India, S. Jayashankar [2], former Minister of Foreign Affairs of India and adviser on national security Sh. Menon [20]. The authors stressed on importance of the articles by well-known Ukrainian orientologists – O. Bordilovska [7],

A. Hrytsenko, I. Kus [5], O. Lukash [10, 11] and foreign specialists so as journalists, among whom a number of publications in foreign publications deserve special attention [17 – 23]. Publications in various editions contain a large and diverse factual material, proposals, considerations. It seems appropriate to summarize and analyse these publications and, based on the results of the analysis of previous Indological studies, focus on the development of author's proposals that can be useful and taken into account in the formation of the National Strategy for the Development of Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of India at the current stage.

The purpose of the study is an analysis of the features of socio-economic development of the Republic of India, main foundations and principles of its foreign policy and the provision of proposals based on which directions for the modernization of Indo-Ukrainian cooperation should be identified, taking into account the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Presenting main material. The Indian model of development is significantly different from many countries of the world, including East Asia in general and China in particular, being unique. This is a special type of country development model. For more than 70 years, India has been in an active and still incomplete movement from an agrarian, patriarchal and almost illiterate society to an urban, industrial and information state. In fact, modern India is a unity of several types of socio-economic systems.

It is a huge transition economy with pronounced contrasts. In particular, a high level of education and a large sector of highly qualified specialists are combined with hundreds of millions of illiterate people, a significant middle class (which is not present in every transition economy) with mass poverty. The presence of contrasts is characteristic of all countries with transition economies that are developing rapidly. However, India has a feature that is probably characteristic only for it – a combination of three systems.

In an incredible way, but quite organically, the Indian economic model combines important features of countries with different systems such as developed capitalist, socialist and developing countries, that represent all “three worlds” presented in modern geoeconomics. Such a unique combination is obviously not found in any other country that largely determines the peculiarities of the Indian development model.

As for India's political system, it was built on a combination of elements of the English (Westminster) model with features of other democracies. Indian state used a combination of (conglomerate) Western liberalism and the Soviet (socialist) planning system in the 1950s-1980s to transform the colonial economy, and as a result of the economic reforms of the 1990s, it gradually rebuilt the country along the lines of a free market.

During the reforms at the end of 20th – beginning 21st centuries the main boundaries of the Indian development model did not change, as a result, India remained a country with a mixed economy. However, it had to be adapted to the new conditions of the world economy, which required qualitatively different impulses, including the abandonment of strict state control, the reduction of its position as an owner, the reconstruction of the planned development of the economy according to the socialist model.

Despite all the difficulties, India has achieved sustained economic growth during the implementation of reforms and modernization policies in 1991–2019. According to this indicator, it entered the top ten fastest developing countries in the world. India recently overtook China in population and claims in the near future to be the third place in the world according to the rate of economic growth. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Indian government has correctly chosen the strategy of reforms, as well as progressive, gradual tactics that took into account the peculiarities and capabilities of the country.

The policy of modernization was based on a fairly broad social background and enjoyed by the support of social and political circles, industrialists and entrepreneurs. This is evidenced by the fact that all Indian governments that have been in power since 1991 were in favour of the continuation and development of reforms, but each of them put forward their own priorities. However, no government raised the question of cancelling reforms or turning back, which created a certain climate of public trust in the policy of modernization.

Indian reforms have demonstrated that without an active state social policy, only existence of economic growth cannot ensure the stable development of society. Such a policy is no less important element of transformation than market reform. Reforms in India showed the presence of the political will of the leadership, the ability to choose a course of development acceptable under specific conditions, taking into account the country's national-state interests. It was the optimal level of balance between India's national interests and the global priorities of world development that contributed to a certain economic progress of the country and significant successes of the modernization policy in general.

For Ukraine and other countries of the post-Soviet space, it is extremely important that the transformations in India were not carried out under the slogan of renouncing the past, but continued and

developed (may be not always with equal persistence and consistency) the best that had already been conquered. They showed that, despite the growing openness to the world market, India is placing the main bet on its domestic resources.

Based on the above mentioned, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba, in our opinion, correctly noted that Indian Prime Minister N. Modi can contribute to the settlement of the situation in Ukraine. In early December 2022, in his address to the Indian television channel NDTV he said that India is an extremely important player on the world stage. In his opinion, Mr. Modi «can make changes with his voice» to the difficult situation in Ukraine [9].

It is also worth taking into account that recently the position of the Indian leadership is gradually changing in favor of Ukraine. Thus, at the beginning of December 2022, N. Modi officially refused the annual meeting with V. Putin after he threatened to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine. Such meetings have been held annually since 2000 (only once was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic). As foreign sources note, India's decision to refuse the summit with Russia participation was formed after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan (Samarkand, September 15-16, 2022), during which N. Modi actually called on the head of Russia to stop the war in Ukraine (his widely known and often quoted phrase that «...now is not the time for war»), he also noted that it is necessary to move on the path of peace and reminded about the importance of democracy, diplomacy and dialogue [15, 16, 19]. It should be noted that India's position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war is based on the principles of its well-known traditional foreign policy – maintaining clear neutrality. It is also determined by a number of objective and subjective factors [see in detail: 5].

India is trying to maintain the regional status quo and the balance of power in South Asia. Official New Delhi sees the war in Ukraine not as a confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv, and not even as a war between the West and the Russia, but as part of a wider rivalry between the West and China. India cannot unequivocally support the West, because in its opinion this would lead to an unnecessary diplomatic confrontation with China, which in turn would create the risk of armed escalation in the disputed border areas (the situation there is permanently worsening and the recent events on the Sino-Indian border are a vivid example of this). Official New Delhi cannot allow a large-scale escalation, as it's not ready for a head-on confrontation with China, and therefore with Pakistan, because there are many unresolved territorial disputes between them [8, 12].

India claims the status of one of the world power centres with its sphere of influence, and therefore consistently supports the ideas of a polycentric multipolar world order. In this context, the main goal of India is not the total defeat of the China, which is a rival, but Beijing's recognition of India as one of the poles of power in Asia – the presence of New Delhi's own sphere of interests in the Indian Ocean, South and Southeast Asia. This partly coincides with the way Moscow substantiated its claims to the West on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine. A certain similarity of general views on the future of the world (not on Ukraine or on the validity of the invasion of our territory) determines India's desire to maintain relations with Russia, but at the same time, India has never approved Russian actions in Ukraine and constantly advocates a peaceful settlement of the military conflict [4, 13, 14].

It is not beneficial for India to weaken Russia to the status of a «raw material donor» or «junior partner» of China. This is not corresponding to New Delhi's geostrategic calculations, because it shifts the asymmetrical balance of power in the region in favour of China. It is very important for India to keep Russia in the focus of its political attention and ensure that no new threats to national security arise through Russia, especially given the volatile situation in neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan. New Delhi is trying with all its might to prevent the formation of something like the «Moscow-Beijing-Islamabad» axis, which began to be considered after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.

Moreover, India wants to preserve its «strategic autonomy», because from its point of view, this is the only way for it to keep the world system in a certain balance, to prevent excessive monopolization of global influence by one of the parties – the USA or China. Supporting one of the parties – the West (US) or the East (China) – would automatically undermine the balance of power. As the war in Ukraine is seen by India as an indispensable marker of choosing a side in this global confrontation, a change of neutral position on the part of New Delhi regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war seems unlikely. At the same time, India will not openly support Russia. One of the reason is the rapprochement of Russia with Pakistan and China in recent years [5].

With a high degree of probability, India will increase its imports of Russian energy carriers due to attractive discounts, advocate for the prevention of monopolization of the sales market by China, and counteract its own energy crisis. It is unlikely that New Delhi will reduce imports from Russia or give up

Russian oil and coal in the near future. At least until India finds alternative suppliers, increases its own production, or increases supplies from the Middle East and the US (if they offer discounts, which is unlikely). Truly saying, the key reason is not the heavy dependence on supplies from Russia, but the difficult domestic situation in the Indian energy industry and the need for discounts. That is why India has a purely pragmatic economic interest in this matter [23].

India will not join the Western sanctions against Russia for political and ideological reasons not related to the attitude towards Ukraine. New Delhi believes that joining the sanctions will destroy its policy of «strategic autonomy», subordinate it to the will of Washington, and also stir up a conflict with China in the region. In addition, in India, as in many Asian countries, exists the scepticism about the application of sanctions by the West, because they believe that at any moment the large countries of Asia can turn into rivals in the eyes of the United States, which they want to punish with the same sanctions.

It should be noted that in the context of sanctions and the withdrawal of many Western firms from Russia, Indian companies are getting opportunities to expand their sales market there due to the lack of major competition. In particular, this concerns the export of food products through the South Caucasus, as well as the export of pharmaceutical companies, which currently have only 2% of the drug market in Russia, but now have the opportunity to expand. In addition, the same applies to the prospects of expanding the import of Russian diamonds.

In general, the war in Ukraine does not pose a critical problem for India's trade and economic interests. In its foreign trade, New Delhi focuses more on Western markets. In contrast to Russia, with which trade turnover barely reached \$8 billion in 2021, trade with EU countries brings India €62.8 billion, and with the United States – \$110 billion. The European Union itself remains one of the largest investors in the Indian economy and according to the results has invested \$ 88 billion there over the past 20 years. The problems with sanctions against Russian banks create discomfort, but do not threaten India's vital interests in this field and do not deepen the situation so much as to force New Delhi to abandon trade with the Russian Federation (this also another example of the Indian pragmatic approach). The military-industrial complex, which is largely dependent on Russian military supplies and has a great importance in India's confrontation with Pakistan and China became a significant for India. Due to sanctions against the Russia, the Indian military industry is under threat of weakening and freezing large projects. Dependence on Russia makes it impossible for India to refuse military-technical cooperation with Moscow. But this dependence is not critical, as evidenced by the following facts. Over the past 20 years, India has done a lot to diversify its military supply (even reducing the share of Russian arms from over 80% in the 1990s to almost 40% today). This is still quite a significant figure, and Russia is undoubtedly one of India's main and key partners in the military industry [5].

By the way Indians do not perceive Russia as a neo-colonial state. If you tell them that Russia behaves like a colonial empire, most of them will be very surprised. But Russia makes good use of this circumstance, tries to play on Indian anti-colonial sentiments and define itself as a representative of India's international interests (especially in the UN Security Council).

Moreover, it is worth taking into account the following important circumstance, which usually is not paid attention to, and it also plays not the last role. It is implied that India and Russia consider themselves strong regional leaders, the first one as a former in the South Asian region and the second one – in Eastern Europe. Each of them keeps neighbouring countries in the zone of its close control, influence and pressure. It is considered unacceptable for any of the countries to go beyond the influence of the region and the regional leader (this is very characteristic of India's regional policy, but this circumstance is rarely paid attention to). Therefore, in India, pressure on a neighbouring state is considered as a necessary and conditioned element of regional policy. In relation to Russia, should be observing the extremely difficult consequences of its «regional policy», the worst example being the large-scale aggression against Ukraine.

Based on the above analysis, it is possible to propose a number of provisions that can be useful and taken into account in the development of the National Strategy for the Development Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of India at the current stage. The intentions of preparing such an important international document were repeatedly reported by Ukrainian diplomatic circles. In this context, it seems appropriate to single out the following provisions:

1. India's neutral position does not mean covert support for the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine. New Delhi constantly emphasizes the need to comply with the norms of international law, which is relevant for Ukraine as well. Criticizing India for neutrality or balancing due to the above-mentioned circumstances and peculiarities of Indian worldview is not right. The same as demanding full accession to sanctions against Russia. It is appropriate in relations with New Delhi to emphasize joint protection of the world order, in which there should be clear rules without ideological divisions, wars and an arms race.

2. In the process of developing the specified strategy, it is important to take into account that India is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. In particular, becoming a permanent member of the Security Council is one of the main and long-awaited tasks of modern India. Note that Russia positions itself as a permanent «defender» of India, a kind of «pusher» of this issue. But if Russia is recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism, it will automatically «drop out» from the UN Security Council members. India can and has the right to occupy this place (permanent member) (we emphasize that only China occupies such a position among the Asian states in the UN Security Council). It seems that such a possibility will be quite real for India in the condition of more decisive position on the issues of Russian war against Ukraine. Therefore, a field for «subtle diplomatic work» for both Ukraine and its allies is really existing.

3. A long duration of the war in Ukraine is not beneficial for India, because it diverts US attention from allies and weakens the American presence in the Asian region, which corresponds to Indian security interests in the context of confrontation with China. New Delhi will certainly support any peace talks of Ukraine and possibly promote them at the international level and may even (under certain circumstances) agree to act as a guarantor of Ukraine's security. In addition, the prolongation of the war puts India in an awkward position vis-à-vis the EU countries, in whose support New Delhi has an interest as opposed to China.

4. Most of the factors that shape India's position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war are not related to Ukraine, but are mostly caused by political and ideological issues, peculiarities of foreign policy and the internal perception of the world around by Indians. It is necessary to work with such issues comprehensively and constantly. In particular, systematic work with India will take a lot of time and resources and will not be limited to the issue of increasing exports or attracting investments.

5. Due to complex logistics, financial obstacles and sanctions, India can gradually reduce its dependence on Russian arms imports by diversifying supply sources. And when New Delhi begins to develop its own industrial complex, it can be offered to create joint Ukrainian-Indian enterprises, so that national industries develop together. Aviation, as well as the aerospace industry, are promising directions here (such projects will most likely be able to work in the long term).

6. Ukraine needs to review its policy towards India and, in general, South Asia, namely to immediately activate direct political dialogue. For this reason, it is necessary to optimize the training of professional specialists in this direction, reshape the work of the embassy, strengthen the media presence (media diplomacy, e-diplomacy), develop a separate regional strategy, begin to establish broad academic ties with universities and create joint analytical centres, more actively involve specialists who know the local context, cultural and mental realities of such countries as India, actively work with leaders of public opinion, including through social networks.

7. Ukraine is unlikely to be able to radically change its policy towards India or secure its full support for its position towards the Russian Federation, since most of the reasons for India's current positioning in the context of the war have nothing to do with official Kyiv, and sometimes Moscow, and Ukraine has no influence on such Indian vital interests. In addition, the established attitude towards Ukraine also affects the quality of bilateral relations and it will not be possible to change it quickly, at least without established political connections, media presence, etc. Therefore, in the short- and medium-term perspective, Ukraine should focus on educational and humanitarian cooperation, establishment of regular political dialogue and development of close academic ties between the two countries. The All-Ukrainian Association of Indologists (National Academy of Science of Ukraine) can play a certain role in this.

8. For the development of more effective humanitarian cooperation, should be considered and resolved the issue of preparation and signing a framework agreement between Ukraine and India in the field of humanitarian cooperation (including cooperation in the fields of science, education, culture, journalism, tourism). The lack of such an international document for many years does not allow Ukraine to develop and promote the policy of «soft power» on Indian territory, which is quite actively and successfully used by Russian, Chinese and other diplomatic and public missions.

9. In the context of the development and promotion of the «soft power» policy, exists an urgent need to organize the Ukrainian Cultural Center and its branches in New Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and other Indian cities. With the help of such institutions (as evidenced by the experience of other countries) Ukraine will have an opportunity to change the perception of the Indian public about Ukraine, its role and significance in the modern world, and to stimulate support in the Indian leadership circles for the benefit of our country. With the assistance of such centers, it is worth setting up and intensifying scientific internships, conferences, seminars, lectures of scientists, educators, cultural figures of Ukraine in India (for the possibility of accepting Indian specialists, especially scientists, educators, journalists) on exchange.

10. It is extremely important to activate and raise the role of Ukrainian mass media in the Indian environment; apparently Indian journalists write about this problem. Thus, Indian journalist R. Ghosh believes that the main problem is the insufficient presence of Ukraine in the information space of India and an excessively dry (uninteresting and short summary) presentation of information: «...it seems to me that the representatives of Ukraine in India were unable to shed light on the atrocities that are taking place in the war... If you read the Indian mass media, you communicate with Indians have the impression that they don't know anything about the atrocities committed by Russian troops in Ukraine». In his opinion, many Indians do not consider Russia to be an aggressor country, because of lack of information [6]. At the same time, India's state media supports and propagates the neutral position of the government. In order to change this situation, it is necessary to hold many public events about the Russian-Ukrainian war in India, to intensify the activities of the Ukrainian embassy in New Delhi, and to organize an exchange of journalists and public figures between Ukraine and India.

Conclusions. As a result of the conducted research, the need for improvement of directions, forms and mechanisms of Ukrainian-Indian cooperation was revealed. The above mentioned proposals from the point of view of analysing India's position on the problems of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the importance and authority of this state in solving international issues, as well as taking into account the main traditional principles of its foreign policy, in our opinion, should be taken into account in the process of developing a modern foreign policy course of Ukraine in relation to India.

Prospects for further research are seen in the analysis of the level of future dynamics of bilateral Indo-Ukrainian cooperation and their correlation in accordance with the evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as the prospects and results of the development and implementation of the National Strategy for the Development Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of India.

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Лукаш О. І., Тихоненко І. В. Індія у контексті російсько-української війни та перспектив українсько-індійського співробітництва

Питанню позиції Індії у російсько-українській війні присвячені чисельні публікації відомих українських та іноземних фахівців і журналістів. У статті представлений короткий аналіз цих публікацій і, спираючись на результати попередніх індологічних досліджень, акцентовано увагу на головних аспектах визначеної проблеми. Підкреслено, що позиція Індії з питань війни в Україні будується на основі і принципах її традиційної зовнішньої політики – збереження чіткого нейтралітету. Офіційний Нью-Делі розглядає війну в Україні не як протистояння Москви та Києва, і навіть не як війну Заходу та РФ, а як частину ширшого суперництва між Заходом і Китаєм. Перманентне суперництво та загострення відносин з Китаєм вимагає від Індії підтримувати різнопланові зв'язки з РФ задля підтримки своїх безпекових можливостей, продовження військово-технічного і торгово-економічного співробітництва з метою утримання свого впливу в Індійсько-Тихоокеанському регіоні. У статті розглянуті можливості та перспективні напрями українсько-індійських зв'язків з метою поліпшення відносин між Україною та Індією і посилення індійської підтримки нашої країни в умовах російсько-українській війні.

В результаті проведеного дослідження було виявлено необхідність вдосконалення напрямів, форм та механізмів українсько-індійського співробітництва. У роботі викладені конкретні пропозиції щодо поліпшення українсько-індійських відносин та розвитку співробітництва з точки зору аналізу позиції Індії з проблем російсько-української війни, значення та авторитету цієї держави у вирішенні міжнародних питань, позитивного історичного досвіду розвитку двосторонніх відносин у минулому. Запропоновані авторами пропозиції та ідеї відносно розвитку та вдосконалення двосторонніх контактів, на думку авторів, можуть бути врахованими у процесі розробки та впровадження Національної стратегії розвитку відносин та співробітництва України з Республікою Індія.

Ключові слова. зовнішня політика Індії, Україна, Індія, Росія, російсько-українська війна, українсько-індійські відносини.